Saturday, May 23, 2009

اولین سخنرانی تلوزیونی میر حسین موسوی

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Timur Goksel on Shi’ite identity and Hezbollah

Monday, May 18, 2009

Interesting documentary on Iran's first post-revolutionary Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan

Part 1



Part 2



Part 3

Monday, May 11, 2009

My pithy review of the terrible propaganist Con Coughlin latest offering!


Khomeini's Ghost: Iran Since 1979 by Con Coughlin, Macmillan (20 Feb 2009)

A truly god awful piece of trash if there ever was one. Coughlin distorts basic facts, and writes in a highly incendiary way, as opposed to presenting basic facts and information in a calm, sober and scholarly fashion. As Azadeh Moaveni makes clear in her review for the New York Times: "Given the current attitudes in Washington about Iran, it seems Coughlin’s book has arrived one administration too late." Coughlin is wildy out of step with the times and I hope book sales reflect people's weariness of fearmongering demagogues.

Coughlin repeats the Bush melodrama of Absolute Good vs. Absolute Evil, with little appreciation for the subtlety and nuance reality actually demands. I suggest you read Moaveni's review in the NYT entitled "Most Fundamentalist" for a more detailed picture and cataloguing of Coughlin's many rudimentary mistakes, omissions and outright lies.

If you’re interested in reading an insightful and illuminating primer on contemporary Iranian history read Ervand Abrahamian’s “A History of Modern Iran”, “Iran Between Two Revolutions” or Michael Axworthy’s “Empire of the Mind”.

Couglin makes spurious and sensationalist claims on the most tendentious and thin of evidence. Please examine the footnotes. Not a single Persian language source and in a self-referential and somewhat Orwellian fashion he refers to his own newspaper articles in order to vindicate his flagrantly baseless assertions.

Couglin is an incredibly suspect figure. In research published by the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran the sources of 44 articles written by Coughlin about Iran between 29/10/2005 and 10/10/2006 were examined and the following conclusions were made:

* Sources were unnamed or untraceable, often senior Western intelligence officials or senior Foreign Office officials.

* Articles were published at sensitive and delicate times where there had been relatively positive diplomatic moves towards Iran.

* Articles contained exclusive revelations about Iran combined with eye-catchingly controversial headlines.

* The story upon which the headline was based does not usually exceed one line or at the most one paragraph. The rest of the article focused on other, often unrelated, information.

It also should not be forgotten that Coughlin propagated the claim that the Iraqi army could access weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. This was the same claim, later discredited, used in the so-called "dodgy dossier" produced by the British intelligence services. Be wary of anything this man writes!

Friday, May 8, 2009

AIPAC Propaganda Machine Goes into Overdrive

Monday, May 4, 2009

Economist Ha-Joon Chang on “The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism”



Changbk2web

The US government has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into the US economy in the wake of the financial crisis. But what steps are being taken to address the crisis on a global scale? The worldwide financial crisis is forcing some to rethink the neoliberal policies widely blamed for the financial collapse. We speak with University of Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang, author of Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism.

Sunday, May 3, 2009

Noam Chomsky: Obama new champion of Capitalism


Obama new champion of Capitalism
Sun, 26 Apr 2009 01:22:44 GMT
By Susan Modaress

The following is a Press TV's Autograph interview with sociopolitical analyst and cognitive scientist Noam Chomsky on the policies of the new US administration and the chances of 'change' under President Barack Obama.

Chomsky: The best comment on [this issue] was made by advertising industry. They give a prize every year to the best marketing campaign of the year and for 2008 they gave it to Barack Obama. He beat out Dell computers and Apple computers. And the executives said that…exalted this [saying] "as we have been marketing candidates like commodities ever since Ronald Regan, I think, this was the best we ever did." That is when it changed the atmosphere in corporate boardrooms about how to manipulate and manage and so on. And that is about right. It was a very effective advertising campaign. They did what they have to do. Elections are pretty much run by the advertising industry. And they read polls, they know what people think, and they pay a lot of attention to them. So they know that, on a great many issues, both political parties are well to the right of the population. So it is a good idea to keep away from issues and to focus on personalities, body language, qualities, and, what they call, values and things like that.

Modaress: Do you think that America was ready for this change or is this even a change?

Chomsky: Well, America is definitely ready for a change every year. Every party manager knew that. In fact the polls tell you 80% of the public thinks that things are going in the wrong direction. Now that tells every party manger would better focus on change. So both campaigns -- Obama and McCain -- highlighted change.

But does that mean there is going to be change? No, not necessarily. There will be some changes but one change is that the Bush administration was very unusual in American history. There is a pretty narrow spectrum within the political range, but the Bush administration was way off the spectrum. Especially the first term was unusual in its brazen arrogance…, its offensive manner. It has alienated even allies. Its violence and aggressiveness…. And, in fact, the attitudes towards the United States throughout the world just plummeted in reaction to this. Now, the second term they sort of moderated that stance to some extent, but it was pretty clear that any candidate who comes in is going to move back more toward the normal centre and Obama has, in fact, done so.

Modaress: So, do you think that the Bush legacy will be marked by these things that you noted?

Chomsky : Well, the Bush legacy will be marked by a series of just incredible catastrophes. Everything they touched turned into a disaster, whether it was the invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan or Hurricane Katrina or the financial crisis. There are few things, which did, had a positive impact. A couple of things…. For example, they played a constructive role leading to a partial peace treaty in Sudan between north and south, increased aid to Africa…. So, there were some positive developments, but, by and large, it is a record of just unusual catastrophes. Which is why, if you look at the 2008 elections, it was unusual in that both parties ran against the incumbent president. The Republicans also ran against him because he was so unpopular.

Modaress: There is a perception right now here in the United States right now that with the "Wind of Change" prevailing in the Washington DC, that "we are seeing the end of American capitalism as we knew and the end of American imperialism as we knew it." Would you agree with that theory?

Chomsky: No. For one thing…. The American capitalism…. What is happening now in the financial industry is unusual. The government is stepping in entirely to partly manage and take over part of the financial institutions. But that is the norm. That has happened all the time in the industrial circuit and even in financial institutions. So, for example, Citigroup is now being bailed out with a huge amount of tax payer funds. Ronald Regan did pretty much the same thing in the early 1980s. I think the whole of the advanced industry, the HIGH-TECH industry, comes out of the state circuit, places like MIT is among the places that develop the computers, the internet, lasers, most of HIGH-TECH economy that includes pharmaceuticals and so on.

I mean, the system that we have, which is called capitalism, is basically a system in which the public pays the costs and takes the risks and profit is privatized. That is something of an exaggeration but it is very largely true. In fact, if you take the financial institutions, I mean, a common phrase in Washington and the media these days is "too big to fail".

Now, what does that mean? It means when you have an institution like, say, Citigroup or Bank of America, it is so big that the government can not allow it to fail and then the public will have to pay in or step in and make sure it continues to function pretty much as before. Well, that is a is insurance policy, a publicly-granted insurance policy which permits huge institutions to undertake a very risky behavior, from which, of course, you make a lot of profits but, if anything goes wrong, the public pays. Now, that is high-level protectionism and it undermines competitors who do not have that insurance policy. That is just one of many ways which can go on and on in which the United States departs very sharply from market systems.

Now, will that system remain? Well, we can not be sure but the Obama administration is certainly trying very hard to maintain its structure. So, for example, if it takes a Citigroup or Bank of America or General Motors, it would be much cheaper to buy them than to bail them out but that would mean that they are nationalized and under the public control.

Modaress: Is this almost a loophole? The protectionism that that we are seeing on the part of the government…. Is it a loophole towards nationalization?

Chomsky: It has just…. It has always been like that. As I say, the HI-TECH economy is, to a large extent, publicly subsidized. No, that is protectionism; it is just not called protectionism. The terms are used in such a way that they do not really describe…. They have ideologically tinged the terms that we use.

Modaress: Why are Western societies intimidated by these terms?

Chomsky: They are not intimidated. They act the same way. I mean, that is for economic history. The reason that there is a First World and a Third World…, the large reason, part of the reason, is that, from the 18th century, the European societies and their offshoots like the state the United States relied on a very high level of state intervention. Protectionism, subsidy worked in such a way in which the powerful states intervened and they had their economy developed. The colonist societies…, they were subjected to free market principles and they declined, they stagnated. Those are some of the major principles of economic history. I mean, let us take look…outside of the European-US world. There is one country that developed, Japan, and that is the one country that was not colonized.

Is that accidental? No, in fact, if you look at the East Asian growth system, you know one of the miracles of took place in the 20th century, they ruled by following pretty much the kinds of policy that the Europe and the United States had followed in their own development. They rejected the rules of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and developed through various kinds of state intervention.

So, it has changed with time. After the Second World War, when the economy allowed much more hi-technology innovation, the government role increased substantially. And so that is why you have places like MIT. Public-funding mostly extended from funding to develop what became a new economy.

So, these are just general features of the economic history. In fact, it is kind of dramatic right now….it is interesting that nobody notices it... Suppose that a Third-World country has an economic, national crisis, say, Indonesia. The IMF comes in….

They come in. They tell…. They give lectures and instructions to Indonesia as to how to deal with the crisis. First, pay off your debts to us. Second, raise interest rates which lower the crippling economy. Third, the population has to pay for the structural adjustment. And fourth, privatize so we can pick up your assets….

Those are the instructions given to the third world uniformly…. If fact they are given right now, Suppose we had the crisis as we do now. The instructions are the opposite. Forget about the debts…. Lower the interest rates. Just do everything to stimulate the economy. Do not suffer as long as you can and do not privatize. Nationalize, but do not call it nationalization. Just help the public to move a couple of bad assets and subsidize.

So, exactly the opposite prescriptions. Now, all this passes without comment. And, I think, the reason is deeply ingrained in the imperial mentality that we act one way and our subjects act the different way and that traces back through modern economic history and it is a large part of the reason for the split between first world and the rest of world.

Modaress: You have constantly warned of propaganda and how the mainstream media is essentially employed to coy the population into submission, if you may. What role do you think the mass media plays in the current American political system?

Chomsky: They pretty much represent the standard ideological framework that grows from the structure of power in the society. I do not think they are being deceptive…. It is their belief. It is their understanding. I mean, if you had a religious theocracy, the media perfectly honest with you and repeat the claims of the religious theocracy. They may do it by force. They may do it because they believe it…. It is not deception. That is what educated, cultivated people believe and that is deeply rooted in the imperial mentality and has developed over hundreds of years. And the class mentality the rich are supposed to do well and the poor have to pay for it. No, it is pretty natural, belief of a part of privileged people.

Modaress: Moving on to the Middle East, do you think that a two-state solution is possible in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, considering the fact that Israel has a new prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and the recent widespread attacks in Gaza? Are we expecting too much when we ask a two-state solution?

Chomsky I don't think we are asking too much and in the short term I do not think that there any other alternatives, other than just destruction of Palestine.

For Palestinians now there are now two options; one is they are just going to be destroyed. The second is that there will be a two-state settlement.

What is blocking the two-state settlement is not Benjamin Netanyahu. In fact oddly enough if you look back, his government was the first one that even mentioned the possibility of a Palestinian state. Shimon Peres was considered a "dove" and his last words were: there will never be a Palestinian state. We will never allow it. Netanyahu came in later and made some weak remarks about maybe we can have it.

What is crucial is the attitude of the United States. The United States is a renowned world power. In the Middle East it is overwhelmingly dominant. The US has, for over thirty years now, rejected and blocked a diplomatic settlement. Now there has been an overwhelming international consensus since the 1970s on a two-state settlement and on the international border perhaps with minor mutual modifications. It came to the Security Council in January 1976 brought by the Arab states and secured a US veto. And I will not run through the records here but it goes right through to the present…

Modaress: Why? Why did the United States do this?

Chomsky Well, Israel is a valuable asset. Compare Israel with the Palestinians. Israel is a rich, Western, industrial society…and it provides the United States...it is essentially an offshore military base...in fact during the Gaza attack the US was shipping arms to Israel and not just for them to be used in Gaza but to be pre-positioned there for eventual US use. And that has been going on for years. They have formed very close intelligence connections and their advanced industries are very close to the US hi-tech industry. The major ones like Intel and Microsoft and practically all of them are investing heavily in Israel.

For the united States it is just valuable…Take for example the military industry. Obama has just announced that he is increasing US military aid to Israel over Bush, and in fact for a ten-year period. So they are planning over the next ten years to provide something like USD30 billions of military ware. Now for the American military industry that is just a bananza in many ways. For one thing, they will get the sales but for another thing that it helps them sell the less sophisticated arms to the Arab states.

So if you sell fighter planes to Israel, you can then sell some of the less fancy fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. It is just a public gift to the military industry, which has a huge lobby far beyond the Israeli lobby.

In many respects…Israel provides many services to the United States.
But what about the Palestinians? They are weak, they are poor, they are oppressed, and they have no powerful support. I mean leaders of the Arab states may say nice words that is to calm their own populations and they do not do anything for them.

So they offer nothing to the United States. This is elementary basics of the state pariah that tells you that people have human rights to the extent that it is useful for them.

Modaress: What about the United Stats' relations with Iran. There has been talk of the betterment of ties. Any prospects of hope there?

Chomsky Well here is of the issues on which the American public and the leadership are very sharply divided. There was a major poll taken by the world's leading polling agency about a year ago, maybe two years ago, which studied both Iranian and American public opinion and interestingly they turned-out to be very similar.

Large majorities in both countries agreed that Iran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes; about 75% of Americans, because they are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but not nuclear weapons.

In Iran the same majority, roughly 75% agreed that a nuclear weapons Free Zone should be established in the region, which would include Israel, Iran and any American forces deployed there.

The larger majority felt that the United State aught to live up to the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and take steps to eliminate its nuclear weapons.

Another majority believed that there should be no threats against Iran but normal relations. There was not a hint of that in the political system. It is maybe 75% of the population but the not a word in the political system.

Modaress What about the recent announcements and messages on the part of Barack Obama. Do you think that actions speak louder than words in this case?

Chomsky The words themselves are interesting. Obama, very politely, it is not like Bush...he was polite ad friendly and respectful,…what he said was that we would like Iran to have a place in the family of nations, in order to do so it has to turn to peaceful means…away from arms, violence and terror.

If somebody was watching this from Mars, they would crack up in ridicule. The United States is telling Iran to turn away from arms and violence? I mean, the United States spends as much in arms as the rest of the world combined. It is occupying some countries adjacent to Iran. Iran is not occupying Mexico and Canada.

The whole idea is just catatonical but I have not heard a word in the West that is critical, the of the absurdity idea here that describes a very forthcoming gesture. Well, it is forthcoming by western standards but by any other standards that were not tinged by extreme imperialogy it would be an absurdity.

It has been reiterated by others, for example Joe Bidden, the vice-president. He also made a speech about Us and Iranian relations and he said that we would be very willing to negotiate with Iran if they stop their illicit weapons programs and their terror.

Now what are their illicit weapons programs? Now maybe they exist, I do not know.
But US intelligence says they do not exist. Now the Obama administration when it came to office said that we are rejecting the conclusions of the National Intelligence Estimates, when they admitted they had no evidence.

And what is the terror. The terror is support for Hezbullah and Hamas. That is support for, you can have whichever opinion you like about them, terrorists or in fact a resistance, because they defended Lebanon from a US-Israeli attack. Now Hamas, if their actions were criminal we do not know…

Modaress With a look at your long and distinguished career as a scholar, activist, thinker and an intellectual, is there anything that you done more of, or are you pretty much satisfied?

Chomsky I think I should have done more of lots of lots of things. You pick the issue…

Modaress Political activism?

Chomsky There have been a lot more. There have been changes over the past 40 years, in fact positive changes not due to me but due to a lot of people. But, the basic problems still remain, modified but not overcome. Which means there hasnot been enough activism, and its through me too.

Modaress What about the field of linguistics?

Chomsky Same. Actually political activism takes a lot of time away from work I would really like to do. If these would go away I would be happy to work on the problems and the nature of the mental processes, cognitive processes, and language. There is lots that can be done there...it is interesting…I had a class on it this morning.

But I have done much less than I would have liked to…

Modaress What is next for Noam Chomsky?

Chomsky pretty much the same.

Modaress More books?

Chomsky Yes. Articles, talks, reviews, books. Wahtever comes. Then there is other things. Family. And so on...


Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Iran's Power Struggle by Muhammad Sahimi

SK: Great op-ed by one of the sharpest commentators out there. Was such an op-ed even imaginable in the New York Times during the Bush years? The same goes for Roger Cohen's many important articles over the past months. Can major newspapers and publications really be so spineless as to only publish those views consonant with whoever happens to be in Washington or the putative "mood" of the country? I guess so. Great article by Muhammad Sahimi in any case. I hope they ask him make to write many more in the coming months.

The New York Times


April 29, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor

Iran’s Power Struggle

Just when relations between the United States and Iran seemed to be turning for the better as a result of President Obama’s recent overture to Iran, a new impediment emerged. Roxana Saberi, a 31-year old Iranian-American freelance journalist was arrested in Tehran, put on trial behind closed doors and convicted of espionage for the U.S.

What is the root cause of this ugly turn of events? It has everything to do with the ongoing power struggle in Iran. But, unlike the past, the struggle is between various factions in the conservative camp, not between the reformists and the hard-liners.

Anyone who is familiar with Iran’s power structure knows that the ruling conservatives are badly fractured and in deep trouble. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration has proved unable to address Iran’s mountains of social, economic and political problems and is confronted by internal and external opposition.

Internally, the reformists probably have their best chance in years to remove the conservatives from the executive branch.

Externally, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric has isolated Iran. This has set off a fierce behind-the-scenes power struggle between the pragmatic conservatives and the hard-liners. While the conservatives have tried hard to hide their differences, the deep fissures in their ranks have become all too obvious.

Iran’s presidential elections will take place on June 12. They will perhaps be the most important elections since the 1979 revolution because the differences between the reformists and conservatives have never been so glaring. The reformists have two candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi, a popular prime minister in the 1980s, and Mahdi Karroubi, the former speaker of Iran’s Parliament, the Majlis, who also ran a strong campaign in the 2005 elections.

The conservatives have not announced their candidate, simply because they cannot decide whom to support. The relatively moderate and pragmatic conservatives do not want to back President Ahmadinejad for a second term; they wish to nominate a relatively moderate candidate. They believe that, otherwise, one of the two reformist candidates will be elected, possibly in a landslide. They also want to pursue détente with the Obama administration.

The hard-liners, on the other hand, wish to continue supporting Mr. Ahmadinejad and his policies. Although Mr. Ahmadinejad himself has expressed interest in pursuing negotiations with the United States, his core supporters are suspicious of President Obama’s overture and oppose rapprochement.

Mr. Ahmadinejad’s supporters include most of the intelligence apparatus, part of the Revolutionary Guards high command and hard-line clerics and their followers, led by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, an ultra-reactionary whose disciples play important roles in the Ahmadinejad administration and in the judiciary. It is the hard-line faction within the judiciary that has convicted Ms. Saberi.

The hard-liners feel threatened by any rapprochement with the United States for two reasons. First, improvement in the relations will strengthen the reformist and democratic groups in Iran, as the threat of American military attacks on Iran dissipates. In that case, the reformers will no longer be accused of acting against Iran’s national interests by advocating détente with the United States.

At the same time, aware of their own deep unpopularity, the hard-liners are terrified by the prospects of a “velvet revolution” and, thus, have become obsessed with preventing contacts between Iranian and American people, which will happen if the relations between the two nations improve. Ms. Saberi’s arrest should be seen in this context.

Second, better relations with the United States will necessarily imply the lifting of at least some of the economic sanctions imposed by Washington and its allies on Iran. This will threaten the immense economic power of the hard-liners, who control a significant part of Iran’s official and underground economy.

A few years ago Mr. Karroubi disclosed that the hard-liners control 63 ports that are outside the government’s control. They use these ports to import cheap, low-quality materials and commodities from China and other East Asian nations, greatly hurting Iran’s own industrial production, but becoming fabulously rich. If the sanctions are lifted and a more open society emerges, the hard-liners will lose much of their economic power. Moreover, the potential for the emergence of a freer press will most likely reveal the depth of their corruption, bringing with it the loss of their political power.

Thus, the hard-liners are trying to create a new crisis with the U.S. in order to prevent any rapprochement, as well as distract attention from their factional fighting.

Ms. Saberi is a victim of the fighting between the hard-liners and the pragmatic conservatives. The charges against her appear to be bogus. Indeed, Rooz, the popular online Iranian newspaper, reported that Ms. Saberi has been told that, if she “confesses” and “names names,” she will be released and allowed to leave Iran. The names to be revealed will presumably be those of prominent opponents of the hard-liners.

Ms. Saberi’s predicament shows the significance of any improvement in relations between Iran and the United States. Such improvements will ultimately result in a more open and democratic Iran, where the rule of law will be supreme and the gross violations of human rights that have become widespread under Mr. Ahmadinejad’s government will stop. This would have great impact on the quest for peace in the Middle East.

Muhammad Sahimi is a professor of chemical engineering and materials science at the University of Southern California.

Ahmadinejad on This Week

Part 1:



Part 2:

Friday, April 24, 2009

The Money that Prays by Jeremy Harding

London Review of Books

The Money that Prays

Jeremy Harding

Last September, as dust and debris from the tellers’ floors began raining onto the empty vaults below, a note of satisfaction was sounded by bankers in the Arab world. Financial institutions sticking to the tenets of Islam, they announced, were largely immune from the debt crisis. Devout Muslims may lend and borrow under certain conditions; they can even buy and sell debt in the form of ‘Islamic’ bonds, but most other kinds of debt trading are frowned on. Al Rajhi Bank, based in Saudi Arabia, and the Kuwait Finance House posted impressive profits in 2008. Both have come under some nervous scrutiny in 2009 but their ability to weather the recession that has set in behind the credit crunch is not at issue.

Unlike most banks in the Middle East, Al Rajhi Bank and KFH are ‘sharia-compliant’ businesses, which means simply that they try to abide by the evolving body of rules known as the sharia – ‘the path to the headwater’ – which govern the lives of Muslims. The sharia serves mostly as a guide to personal conduct, though some rules are drafted into the legal codes of majority-Muslim states. It’s founded, we’re always told, on revealed truth from the Koran and exemplary stories from the Hadith, the sayings and doings of the Prophet. But the real influence of the sharia lies in the way this material is constantly read and recast by modern Islamic scholars, reinventing old traditions or asserting new ones. Whatever they take it to be, growing numbers of Muslims are keen to stay on the path when it comes to banking and finance. The global Muslim population is upwards of 1.3 billion – roughly one in every five people on earth – and, with a religious revival of twenty or thirty years’ standing, the way of Islam is now a crowded thoroughfare. It is plied by a great diversity of travellers from different parts of the world; some have money to burn, others next to none, but anybody with a modicum of wealth is nowadays a potential opportunity for banks offering sharia-compliant retail services: current accounts, straightforward financing schemes and home-ownership plans.

The term ‘Islamic finance’ wrests a lot of activities down to a catch-all definition. The same is true, in the financial universe, of the words ‘sharia’ and ‘Islam’ itself. Sharia is not a single, coherent jurisprudence for Muslims; there are various schools of interpretation and marked disagreements within each of them. ‘Islam’, a broad term of convenience for most non-Muslims, is a power-point word in the City: it tells bankers and traders that every day for a few minutes they should shut out the din of the money that merely talks and tune in to the money that prays. But why bother, given that sharia-compliant finance is probably worth less than 1 per cent of the total value of the world’s stocks, bonds and bank deposits? This was reckoned at about $170 trillion in 2007; it’s much less than that now of course, but even so, with a value of around $700 billion, Islamic stocks, bonds and bank deposits remain a minority affair, just as Muslims remain a minority in global terms.

What fascinates the markets about Islamic finance, however, is its dramatic growth in recent years and confident predictions that it’s set to expand at 15 to 20 per cent every year. Its allure for moderately prosperous, pious Muslims – and quite a few non-Muslims recoiling from the debt crisis in anger and disgust – is different. They admire what they see as a promise to achieve stability and transparency, and a sense of proportion about money: look it in the eye, tell it you like it, but admit that you have lingering doubts about the transcendent value of paper. That’s an unsophisticated position, but since the credit crunch not many people trust the sophisticated keepers of the modern money culture; in this sense the rise of sharia-compliant products is also a challenge to the unofficial, polytheist faith of offshore Britannia: the worship of markets in general and financial markets in particular.

One of the central differences between the Islamic and conventional approaches to finance is that our own cults – which may well see a revision before the end of this crisis – ascribe supernatural powers to money. Cult specialists are at great pains to understand and control how it works, but admit that it does so in magical ways that go beyond the effects of human commerce (for the markets, too, have magical attributes, including innate goodness). Whatever we want from money, we suspect, as devotees, that in the end it will always behave as it sees fit. Our awe of it is a bit like a rapt meditation on the way the shower of gold behaves – shimmering and falling – when it cascades over Danaë in her cloister in Argos. In the story, it’s merely the form chosen by Zeus for her seduction, but in our meditation, there is no Olympian in disguise and no intention to seduce, just the metal shimmering and falling, in consummate self-expression, as deity and dogma. Islamic approaches – there are quite a few – are much closer to Nonconformist and Anglican traditions, where the divinity stands to the side of money, reminding the faithful that he is one thing and mammon another. Money, in this view, is an object of caution rather than superstition – and, in spite of its dangers, a useful tool for anyone who wants to build a respectable world, with God’s instructions pinned to the wall above the workbench.

Maybe this is why sharia-compliant products have been gaining popularity among British Muslims, even if they differ only slightly from conventional ones. Take the home-ownership scheme offered by HSBC’s sharia-compliant range, Amanah (amanah means ‘trust’ in the moral and legal sense). Muslims are forbidden to pay or receive interest and troubled by conventional lending, because it appears to put the burden of risk on the borrower not the lender: in the Islamic view, no transaction is ethical unless risk is fairly distributed between the parties. HSBC Amanah’s scheme is based on an Islamic contract known as ‘diminishing musharaka’ and it’s approved, like all HSBC Amanah’s services, by a board of sharia scholars. A would-be home-owner must put up 40 per cent of the cost price (much less before the credit crunch); the property is registered in a trust (amanah) as a jointly owned asset, with the bank’s majority ownership diminishing over an agreed period, as regular payments are made; the customer promises to buy the bank’s share, and the bank promises to sell it to the client. The property is envisaged as a set of units and the customer’s payments as twofold: one part is rental, for the right to live in it, another is a form of unit-acquisition. The trust keeps a tally of the bank’s diminishing ownership and the growing share to the customer. At term, the trust is dissolved and the home passes to the customer.

In the meantime, no interest has been charged. But the rental payments received by HSBC Amanah for its willingness to share a risk will have been reviewed – and therefore been subject to change, much like the interest charge on a variable-rate mortgage – at regular intervals. Indeed, rental charges are likely to track changes in a conventional interest rate, for instance Libor, the London Interbank Offered Rate. In the eyes of some Muslims, the resemblance of the rental element to an interest charge casts doubt on the ‘Islamic’ nature of the scheme; others are happy to say that even when two things are alike, this does not make them identical. The questions of likeness and difference, and what constitutes real compliance, are hotly debated among Muslims throughout the world.

As regards risk-sharing, HSBC Amanah’s scheme seems little different from those of other lenders when customers fail to keep up payments (‘default’ is not a sharia-compliant word). The bank will pursue a customer if it thinks the reasons for the failure were ‘avoidable’, because this would constitute a breach of the promise to buy. But it claims not to handle a genuine misfortune the way conventional mortgage providers deal with a default. Both parties share any losses according to the proportionate ownership at the time. The bank can seize the contents of a customer’s current account to offset some of its own losses, but there the matter ends. No question of a debt-collecting agency taking up where the bank left off. Most mortgage companies in the US also draw a line under default, but among Islamic home-ownership providers in Britain this approach has encouraged prudence. Amjid Ali, who heads HSBC Amanah’s UK operation, told me that in the first five years of its sharia-compliant home-ownership scheme, he had processed applications to the value of £700 million, of which, after judicious sifting, more than half had come good. He knew of only one case that hadn’t worked out: the customer was given 18 months’ grace, at the end of which the house was sold. Devout Muslims who think the HSBC Amanah approach is uncomfortably close to the way a conventional default is handled must surely have had their views confirmed by the government’s insistence to mortgage lenders, since the recession set in, that patience with people in difficulty would put a floor under falling house prices and send out a ‘caring’ signal (reluctant bankers call it empathy). But perhaps the same Muslims derive a certain satisfaction from the fact that conventional mortgage lenders are beating a path to the headwater.

A home-buyer signing up to a diminishing musharaka would have to take out buildings insurance with a clause that covered the bank as well. But Islamic tradition is uneasy with conventional insurance. First, there’s contractual uncertainty (the devilish detail of insurance policies); second, a risk has been bought by another party, and this is scarcely ever acceptable; third, far from looking like circumspection, conventional insurance has every appearance of a punt, with croupier and client sizing up the odds – and gambling is forbidden. An Islamic option, now available in the UK, allows devout Muslims to subscribe regular payments to a managed mutual fund and think of the process as an exercise in solidarity.

This arrangement, known as takaful, was on offer from HSBC Amanah until the end of last year, when it realised that customers found the costs too high: ethical products, like principles, are more expensive, and less profitable, than off-the-shelf alternatives. Collective underwriting was the main feature of the retired model, shared with other takaful services clinging on in a difficult market. The sharia board instructed HSBC that if the fund was underspent by more than £25 per subscriber in a given year, members could have money back or make it over to the launch of a micro-credit scheme in Pakistan. Rising costs are the reality of most insurance, but for takaful members they are mitigated by the concept of ‘donation’; subscribers may be grudging or disgruntled, but tradition urges them to see the cost of mutuality as part of their obligation to share risk with their fellow members. If it seems unacceptably high, and there are enough takaful co-operatives around, they’re free to chase down a better option.

Takaful cover has its origins in Arab seafaring mutuals (not unlike the whaling mutuals, centuries later, of the Quaker communities in New Bedford and Nantucket). It is a small sector of the global insurance business, already thriving in Malaysia and said by its advocates to be growing throughout the world. In Britain, which prides itself on its multiculturalism and its financial services in almost equal measure, takaful has been endorsed by the minister for trade and investment, the Chartered Insurance Institute and the lord mayor of the City of London. Like all sharia-compliant products in the UK – and everywhere, as far as I know – it’s available to non-Muslims. One Muslim scholar told me that they already account for 16 to 20 per cent of the clientele for Islamic retail products in Britain. No need to recite the shahada if you want a sharia-compliant loan from the Islamic Bank of Britain, Lloyds TSB or a UK branch of the Arab Banking Corporation.

The idea of conventional insurance as a wager is taken seriously, and sometimes to extremes. Until he was denied the right to re-enter the UK in 2005, Omar Bakri Muhammad, the Syrian radical, was said to drive around uninsured on the grounds that a third-party policy with Kwik Fit or the AA was an abomination in the eyes of God. As a proselytiser for Hizb ut-Tahrir and later a star of Al-Muhajiroun, Bakri had a headstrong attachment to the sharia, even when he was a guest of the Home Office. Many British Muslims, pleased to see the back of him, thought that the danger he courted by refusing to take out cover was itself a gamble in which he wagered his faith against the laws of his host country. Perhaps, if he’d still been around, he’d have joined the first British sharia-compliant car insurance scheme, Salaam Halal Insurance, when it was launched last summer (call centres handle inquiries ‘in English, Arabic, Bengali, Gujarati or Urdu’).

It isn’t just in Britain, and it isn’t only in the retail banking sector, that sharia-compliance is catching on. The last ten years have also seen a surge in sharia-compliant securities available to corporate and institutional investors in many parts of the world who want to stick to the rules of the faith. It’s a new impulse: in the 1970s, when the oil-producing states were awash with money, there weren’t too many worries about petrodollars flooding into the purchase of US Treasury bonds, even though they bore interest, and there were few alternatives to conventional securities. This isn’t the case any longer. Malaysia is rich with opportunities for investors in compliant bonds; in Europe, the German Land of Saxony-Anhalt issued the first ‘Islamic’ government bond in 2004; the British Treasury has also looked into the possibility of issuing sharia-compliant bills. Meanwhile there’s no shortage of choice in equities. The Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) started up in 1999: it now has dozens of indices and lists hundreds of companies whose products are approved by its board of sharia scholars.

Nation-states may decide to devalue their currencies or privatise their telecommunications, but the odds are against them adopting full sharia-compliance. A few years ago Sudan had a unitary sharia banking system, but since the peace deal between Khartoum and the non-Muslim SPLA in 2005, conventional banking has become the norm in southern Sudan. That leaves Iran as the only country that boasts a banking system operating fully on Islamic principles (the evils of interest, it argues, obtain only if the borrower and lender are wholly distinct, and since Iranian banks are nationalised, the country’s interbank lending rate is regarded as a family foible). All other Muslim-majority states have conventional or dual systems; in all cases, the central banks behave conventionally.

Conversion to sharia would be ruinous for a wealthy city-state like Dubai, thriving – until the crunch – on Western finance and the ‘conventional’ lifestyles of expatriates. At the end of last year, the monthly retail-purchase interest on a Platinum Visa card issued by the National Bank of Dubai was 2.99 per cent, while Dubai’s sovereign debt stood at 148 per cent of GDP – both well out of order for a conscientious Muslim. Dubai has been on the ropes since last September, but even in better times, the ruling family, like the government of Malaysia, had encouraged sharia-financing across a range of state-funded development projects. Gulf regimes are keenly aware of the changes in fashion that have driven demand for sharia-compliance.

So is the private sector. Many innovative sharia-compliant instruments have been theorised – and some of them applied – by companies whose interest in Islam is decidedly recent, among them Deutsche Bank as well as HSBC. Their idea is to access the large amounts of cash swilling around to no great avail in the Gulf: an ambition reciprocated by the owners of this money, who want to put it to work. The difference between now and 1973 is not one of quantity: liquidity in the Gulf has been high again, partly as a result of oil prices, partly because billions of dollars were repatriated from the West by worried owners after 9/11, but also because the Islamic revival has left many Muslims doubting the wisdom of conventional investment. The diffusion of sharia-compliant financial products has opened new routes for their money. For a while some of it headed towards Malaysia and, until the end of last year, plenty was creeping westward again. The appetite for world markets remains strong, but it now answers more closely to the will of God.

The prohibitions for Muslims are puzzling to the modern commercial mind. The first obstacle for a pious Muslim trading and banking in conventional economies is interest, the term I’ve been using for the Arabic riba, though its literal sense is closer to ‘excess’ and it is sometimes translated as ‘usury’. Often, in the Hadith and even more in recent proselytising on the internet, riba is said to be ‘eaten’. One of the objections to riba is its propensity to up-end the social order. A person who consumes riba bungles the proper management of need – his own and his debtor’s – whereupon the grand plan of give and take, sufficiency for rich and poor alike, begins to come apart. This, as Charles Tripp explains in Islam and the Moral Economy, is also a challenge to ‘the balance and proportion of God’s ordering of the universe’, which must be reflected in ‘human relations’. Islamic tradition warns that riba is likely to lead to injustice and exploitation.

There’s a categorical objection, too: that money may not be conjured up from money to generate like from like. The goods that served (we’re told) as currency in Islamic tradition – gold, silver, salt, grain and dates – can only be exchanged ‘hand to hand’, i.e. in a spot transaction, without deferment; and only at parity, one quantity for its exact equivalent, no more, no less. It’s not clear why you’d want to swap something – a gold weight, say – for its identical other, but the point here is probably that units of currency, unlike the shirt or the saddle for which they’re exchanged, must be beyond any cavilling with regard to value for the system to hold up: an Islamic marker set down 14 centuries ago against arbitrage. In a story told by Abu Said al Khudri, one of Muhammad’s younger companions, the Prophet describes the transaction of a greater number of low-grade dates for a smaller number of quality dates as riba.

The most famous chapter and verse on riba is in sura 2 of the Koran. It warns that dealing in riba will bring on madness or ‘torment’ (via ‘Satan’s touch’), and that if you’re not prepared to waive a mark-up on a debt, war will be waged against you by God and the Prophet. One sharia-compliant banker I met last year told me that’s about as bad as it gets. There is also an injunction to forgive debt in a broader sense: ‘If the debtor is in difficulty, then delay things . . . Still, if you were to write it off as an act of charity, that would be better for you, if only you knew’ (the rules followed by HSBC Amanah try to catch something of this). The charging of riba, it follows, is always a missed opportunity to act generously, to give where a gift is in order, a gesture highly prized in Islamic tradition. In a faith embodied by a trader prophet and espoused by an impressive trading community for which, at its height, knowledge was a key commodity, believers are admonished not to confuse riba with trade. From the second sura, again: ‘God has allowed trade and forbidden usury.’

In Economics, Ethics and Religion (1997) Rodney Wilson went through the 6226 verses of the Koran and found that 1400 refer to ‘economic issues’. It follows that there is a vast body of scholarly opinion dealing with money. A fatwa about charging for debt, or any financial matter, issued by a group of experts such as the Fiqh Academy in Jeddah can carry great weight for certain Muslims, and less for others. In the sharia, like any code which hasn’t ossified, the element of interpretation is crucial and within each of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, there are divergent views, especially between conservatives and modernisers and especially about money. Yet not all the source material under interpretation is stable or straightforward. In the Hadith, for instance, it’s said that the Prophet warned against 70 different forms of riba. These have decayed and combined under the pressures of modernity, but there’s still room for doubt. Modern nuance can be as puzzling to a non-Muslim (maybe even a Muslim) as the founding inventories: Wilson records a sharia ruling in the United Arab Emirates which found that simple interest was permissible and only compound interest forbidden.

Riba catches many non-Muslims out. After a long study of Islamic finance, the anthropologist Bill Maurer couldn’t settle on ‘interest’ as the perfect translation: it seemed clear at first but became streaky as he looked closer. ‘Usury’ is the obvious alternative, but are we to rely on the older sense of the term – any charge, however small, for the use of borrowed money – or on the way it’s understood today, as extortionate interest only? Wilson, a professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham who is intrigued by ‘the influences of religious belief on economic behaviour’, holds that riba is usury in the first sense. That’s the view of most practising Muslims; it seems to echo the meaning of the word in Deuteronomy, where Moses instructs the people of Israel not to lend to their own kith and kin at a rate: ‘Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury.’ Very close to ‘interest’ after all then. Yet if, like Melanie Phillips, you believe Islamic banking in the UK merely hastens the day when a green flag is raised over Westminster, it’s important to think of ‘usury’ in the later sense, in order to insist that Muslim law is either deluded or deceitful: ‘The whole issue of sharia finance,’ Phillips wrote last year, ‘is based on a fabrication . . . sharia does not proscribe interest. It proscribes usury.’ Were riba just a term for exploitative lending, however, one or two countries might have shuffled nearer to a unitary sharia banking system. But the sharia has few attractions for exchequers and central banks in a modern economy, where the interest rate is a basic tool of monetary policy. The appeal of sharia-compliant banking and investing is in essence to the individual conscience.

The emphasis on risk-sharing in HSBC Amanah’s products – and all Islamic products – is related to the prohibition on interest: it’s obvious to the devout Muslim that collecting interest on a debt involves no risk worth the name; all that’s required, in this view, is for a creditor to sit back and wait. The exposure involved in the mere lending of money – self-evident to a non-Muslim – is an unticked box in Islamic tradition, while savings, for which non-Muslims see interest as a fair reward, give rise to worries about hoarding: money should be out there doing the work that enables trade to flourish. A Treasury expert would say Islamic tradition approves of narrow money; a historian would remember Bacon’s essay ‘Of Seditions and Troubles’ and his famous dictum that muck is ‘not good except it be spread’. (The essay goes on: ‘This is done chiefly by suppressing, or at the least keeping a strait hand upon the devouring trades of usury.’)

Risk-sharing, like generosity, puts human relations on an even keel in the Islamic view. A capitalist can weigh a risk but shouldn’t accept a promise from a partner to eliminate it: that would be ‘risk-transfer’, which denies the inherent truth of risk. (In the eyes of sharia scholars it also opens up a vista of potential exploitation, especially when risk is passed on in unknowable ways, say in the form of a mortgage-backed security with a dodgy rating.) No one must guarantee investors’ money, except against fraud.

Interest and risk-evasion are largely absent, Islamic investors believe, from the world of stocks and shares. To invest in a company is to sign up to joint ownership and collective risk, while ordinary shares pay dividends not interest. Even so, there are constraints. It is forbidden to invest in companies that have anything to do with gambling and you’re unlikely to find a business listed in the Dow Jones Islamic Markets indexes with more than a toehold in this area of the leisure industry. In sura 2 of the Koran, the evils of drinking and gambling are deemed to outweigh their benefits – though these are granted – and maisir (the drawing of arrows, like straws, to divine a course of action or simply to bet) is condemned in sura 5. There are other exclusions for devout shareholders. Clearly breweries and distilleries are off-limits, along with pork products. Pornography offends on three overlapping counts: shame, obscenity and baghi, loosely speaking, ‘transgression’, ‘injustice’ or ‘trespass’, anything intrusive then, from a misunderstanding of privacy to a foreign occupation. The DJIM indexes exclude most media businesses but also hotel chains, where minibars and adult channels lower the tone (basement gaming rooms too). Critically, daily trading in debt and riba makes almost all conventional financial institutions, including banks, unacceptable.

The way companies that survive this triage are run must next be examined closely. Sharia scholars are unlikely to approve of a firm whose clients owe it large amounts of money – ‘accounts receivable’ – or one that depends on high returns from interest. The bigger question, though, is a company’s financial structure – how much of its capital it has raised by borrowing and how much by selling its performance or potential in the form of share distributions. The DJIM board of sharia advisers screens out any company whose debt is higher than one third of its market capitalisation (a valuation based on the total number of shares issued times the prevailing share price).

Debt is a problem in its own right. Borrowing on a regular, matter-of-fact basis is open to question since sharia scholars are wary of conventional banking’s dependence on interbank borrowing. The ideal Islamic bank, Rodney Wilson told me, is financed entirely by its depositors’ money. In practice, there is plenty of imperfection, but a compliant bank will want to stay as close as possible to this model. Like riba, debt also raises fears about poverty and injustice (some Muslim NGOs are as evangelical about Third World debt as their Christian and secular counterparts). In the Hadith, debt presents a troubling face once the possibility of deferment arises, as it might with a debtor in difficulty. Is it a good thing or a bad thing to put off repayment? Does it matter whether the debtor is wealthy or poor? Bad faith is always threatening to break in on the relationship between a debtor and a creditor: a debtor says he can pay back a loan but how can he be sure? All this drags human relations into the realm of uncertainty – gharar – from which faith, the discourse of absolute certainty, was supposed to protect them. In commerce, gharar is best avoided. Whence the persistence of doubts about contracting for things that don’t (yet) exist: tradition might allow for a joiner taking orders on furniture he hadn’t yet made, but it disqualified the sale of a foal that was still in the body of the mare. Even the benign, textbook version of the forward contract – a farmer and a miller agreeing a grain price ahead of the harvest – brings a sense of uneasiness.

The concept of gharar doesn’t just apply to goods whose status is in doubt, but to bargains whose terms are ambiguous and contracting parties whose liability is vague. Though it’s often translated as ‘hazard’, it’s not the same as risk, which Muslim societies understand as well as anyone. Business risk is unavoidable and begins when a cargo plane taxis towards the runway. Gharar has more to do with the commercial imagination running ahead of itself: speculation still troubles Islamic scholars; many take a dim view not just of credit derivatives, the villains of the banking crisis, but of any instrument whose value is based on a contract for an underlying asset rather than the asset itself. This is changing, slowly, as a growing number of experts wrestle with intellectual tradition till they get to a place where derivatives, some in any case, appear acceptable. But no sharia adviser would approve of an Islamic financial institution bundling toxic mortgage debts into securities and packing them off to market, still less buying them up. To a conscientious Muslim, this is the perfect storm, in which opaque liabilities, the unknown nature of the underlying debt, fair-weather forecasts by ratings agencies, plus risk transfer and riba, conspire to wreck large parts of the fleet. Is there anyone clinging to the flotsam, post-9/15, who disagrees?

Non-Muslims will recognise the process of screening companies out of a portfolio: many charities and individuals have been doing it for years. The fashion in the West for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), which gained ground in the 1980s and 90s, has become a model for Muslims. That’s the view of Mufti Barkatulla, a scholar trained in Uttar Pradesh, and now an adviser on several sharia boards in the UK, among them the Islamic Bank of Britain and Lloyds TSB. He points out that sharia scholars (including the ones who advise the DJIM) rule against investments in tobacco companies and arms manufacturers, even though Islam has no quarrel with either. The sharia is strictly speaking a matter of law, but sharia-compliance and SRI are, in Barkatulla’s sense of it, largely about the intimate decisions of prosperous individuals and the grandiose ‘ethical’ claims of big business. Sharia-compliance doesn’t have the boycott component that turns SRI from a sum of personal choices into a self-conscious movement. Opting away from a conventional current account is hardly the same as refusing to buy sugar grown by slaves, as the Quakers did in the 1790s, or divesting from companies with links to apartheid, as American universities did in the 1980s.

Even so, it’s sometimes seen as a front for Islamic supremacists scheming to overrun the West. The crusader-jihadist wars are a favourable habitat for this kind of idea, which feeds off suspicion and a regular diet of incidental detail. Eccentric Islamists announce that they hope to see Britain under a caliphate; angry groupuscules and male covens dabble in jihadist ideology and scour explosives websites; the Archbishop of Canterbury thinks aloud on Radio 4 about the sharia as ‘an alternative to the divorce courts as we understand them’ and congratulates Muslims ‘on the faithful completion of Ramadan’ as though he were handing round the sherry on Easter Sunday. With all this and years of high-profile terrorist attacks, from New York to Lahore, plus two wars that have not gone well, a person in Birmingham seeking a fee-based home loan begins to look like the enemy.

Before the surge of Islamic banking, many devout Muslims shied away from banks: for the poorly educated, everything, even a non-interest-bearing current account, came under the general heading haram – ‘impermissible’. Banks dealt with interest, therefore Muslims shouldn’t deal with banks. Mufti Barkatulla told me he’d had to mediate in several cases where police raids had turned up large sums of money stashed in people’s homes. Sometimes, he remembered, people were holding £30,000 or more. To the police, this was deeply suspicious; in fact people were hoarding their way out of riba. One of the changes that sharia-compliant banking is bringing in Britain, Barkatulla believes, is that working-class Muslims, older ones especially, are at last shifting ‘from a cash-based to a cashless society’, as Muslim professionals and businessmen did years ago.

If Muslims can’t take part in a conventional economy without breaking the rules, at least they can compromise by keeping track of their infringements and ‘purifying’ the balance by charitable giving equivalent to the amounts in question. These self-administered transfusions are payable over and above the mandatory deduction, known as zakat, that devout Muslims must make and donate to charity in the space of a year. The most common zakat payment is 2.5 per cent per annum on cash, savings and investments less liabilities. (It can be a finicky piece of accounting; the ‘zakat calculator’ at http://www.ramadhanzone.com is worth a visit.) Unbelievers who worry that Muslims may not wish them well – a complicated piece of projection, but not wholly fantastic right now – should put a yellow highlight over the word zakat, and another over ‘purification’. Successful Muslims in the West remitting to the ‘poor’ and ‘needy’, as the rules require, are the worry here. Their money may well go to families of the unemployed in Bradford, NGOs in Kuala Lumpur or prosthetics clinics in Sarajevo, but it can also be headed in the direction of people under fire in the West Bank, Gaza, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir.

At the beginning of last year the Pakistani cleric Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani was a member of the sharia supervisory board at DJIM. A scholar, judge, financial expert and prolific writer, Usmani was also involved with a sharia-compliant mutual in Illinois which Dow had allowed to manage its ‘Islamic’ fund. But there were internet murmurings about Usmani and in the spring, the McCormick Foundation and the ultra-con Center for Security Policy held an anti-sharia finance workshop in Illinois where his published views about jihad and the subjugation of unbelievers came under scrutiny. Media attention now turned to the Illinois mutual. In 2007, somewhere in the sprawling paperwork for a federal ‘terror-funding’ trial in Dallas, it had been named by the government as an ‘un-indicted co-conspirator’ – one of about three hundred – with alleged links to the US Muslim Brotherhood. These, apparently, were forged via the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), a US-based charity at the centre of the investigation. Usmani’s thoughts on the obligations of jihad – in the CPS presentation, they were non-ecumenical to say the least – have done sharia-compliant finance in the US very few favours; he’s no longer a DJIM adviser. As for the Illinois mutual, it’s had to call in the American Civil Liberties Union to help it restore its damaged reputation.

Last year, after a mistrial in 2007, a jury in Dallas found the HLF and five of its members guilty of funding Hamas to the tune of $12 million or more, even though the prosecution conceded that the money was spent on medical facilities and good works. But in the US, charitable gifts, purifications and zakat simply cannot go to Palestinians without donors risking a federal investigation. As David Feige explained in Slate after the mistrial, the HLF was accused of ‘aiding a terrorist organisation by helping it spread its ideology and recruit members. Translation: even those who support good works are guilty of terrorism if the good works make the terrorists look good.’

Governments may strive in their own jurisdictions to compound the hardships of the Palestinians; freedom-loving think tanks may vent their dismay (verging on disgust) about the rise of sharia-compliant mechanisms in the West; but it is too late to quarantine Islamic finance. Alongside the notional clash of civilisations and the real collisions, a very different encounter with Islam has taken place in the worlds of banking and finance. The constant exchange of money and ideas, the morphology of ingenious instruments that can accommodate a different philosophy of wealth-creation, the familiarity with Islamic tradition among conventional financiers and lawyers who draw them up – all this suggests a convergence both more real and less visible than anything that multiculturalism in the arts, the media or interfaith groups was meant to bring about. The old imperatives of trade and profit are at work here, but so is the recent radical style of the money culture itself.

The 1980s may have mourned the death of avant-gardes in the arts, but there was a thriving avant-garde in the City, which became a magnet for cadres of bright, ambitious, untried people with remote horizons, dealers sans frontières. By the end of the 1990s, this gilded bohemia had a good grasp of sharia-compliance and the breadth of modern, secular trading it could offer Muslims with qualms about the way their money had been doubled back in the 1970s. There were fortunes to be made, and an intellectual challenge in the air. The idea that Islamic finance was out to hobble Western values – ‘financial jihad’, as the Center for Security Policy calls it – was greeted with scepticism, even a subversive ‘So what?’ Radical innovation was the watchword and the search was on for complex products that could lock more and more transactions into a compliant framework. Since last September, the dangers of innovation have become clear and the ideal of reckless creativity has taken a hammering.

The world of sharia-compliant finance is largely unscathed: Islamic banks in the Middle and Far East have not followed the low collateral/high borrowing regimes favoured by their conventional competitors at home and abroad; Islamic principles have denied investors any real access to shares in the banking sector and thus any exposure to toxic debt. Yet there is still a hunger for access and experimentation – what Mufti Barkatulla describes, enthusiastially, as a willingness to take risks with interpretation itself; ‘sharia risk’, as he calls it – and a fascination with the sums of money that have been made on markets forbidden to Muslims. To that extent, convergence is still the order of the day, as sharia-compliancy wizards, Muslim and non-Muslim, seek to open up the trade in derivatives to the small but growing number of devout investors who can be persuaded to bid for a calf while the camel is still in labour.

Jeremy Harding is a contributing editor at the LRB. His versions of Rimbaud’s poetry are published by Penguin along with John Sturrock’s translation of the letters.


URL: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n08/hard01_.html

Iran: a faith on trial by Bernd Kaussler

Iran: a faith on trial

Bernd Kaussler

Even as Washington and Tehran inch towards rapprochement, the plight of Iran's minorities should not be forgotten.

23 - 04 - 2009


The Bahá'í's in Iran, the country's largest religious minority, have faced intense persecution and discrimination ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The arrest of seven Bahá'í leaders in 2008 and their impending trial before a Revolutionary Court on charges of espionage is largely representative of the deterioration of human rights under Ahmadinejad's presidency.

Life under Ahmadinejad

After almost a year in prison Tehran's Deputy Prosecutor General, Hassan Haddad, announced in February this year that the trial of the seven Bahá'í leaders would start soon. The charges brought against them are espionage for Israel, insulting religious sanctities and propaganda against the Islamic Republic. In line with the usual secrecy surrounding criminal proceedings and trials in Iran's revolutionary courts, evidence substantiating these allegations has not and will not be made public by the prosecution during or after the trial.

The fate of the seven Bahá'ís, who have been denied access to their lawyer, the Nobel Laureate, Shirin Ebadi - who herself has been harassed for taking on this case - ever since they have been arrested last year, reflects the overall appalling human rights situation in Iran. President Ahmadinejad's tenure since 2005 was as much as marked by populism as it was guided by a penchant for repressive authoritarianism, almost similar to the climate found that during the revolutionary years immediately after 1979. Driven largely by Shi'a eschatology, the doctrine of martyrdom and the ambition to substitute Mohammad Khatami's discourse of Islamic democracy with an absolute form of Islamic government, human rights violations intensified dramatically.

Under the new administration, almost all of the reformist newspapers were shut down and numerous editors, intellectuals and web-bloggers arrested or harassed by state-sponsored vigilante groups. Domestic intelligence services efficiently prevented concerted efforts by reform-minded editors and publishing houses to print journals and newspapers under new names. The daily "Kargozaran" was the latest victim of the government's crusade against reformist outlets when it was shut down on 1 January for condemning Hamas' use of human shields during the conflict with Israel. Governing under a stepped up defense posture, the last three years have shown that the regime's biggest fear centered on a perceived "velvet revolution" from within the country. Charges of "endangering national security" have been brought against prominent academics, filmmakers, human rights activists as well as physicians.

Whilst the espionage charges brought against the Bahá'ís may well seem to fit within this pattern, repression of the Bahá'í community has long been disclosed as a concerted government strategy by the U.N. Human Rights Commission when it published a memorandum sent from the Revolutionary Cultural Council in 1991 and signed by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. The document can best be described as the Iranian government's grand strategy of suppression against Bahá'ís as it contains specific orders for security and intelligence services so that "their progress and development are blocked." (For the original memorandum in Persian see http://iran.bahai.us/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/5_theisrccdocument.pdf.)

In 2005, the Chairman of the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces sent a memo to the Ministry of Information, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the Commander of the Basij Resistance Forces, the Commander of the Police Force and the Deputy of its Intelligence Branch and the Chief Commander of the Army. The directive which is classified "highly confidential" and "urgent/immediate", states that on instructions of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces "has been given the mission to acquire a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of members of the Bahá'í Faith [...] for the purpose of identifying all the individuals". The letter asks the recipients "to, in a highly confidential manner, collect any and all information about the above-mentioned activities of these individuals". Following this directive, Bahá'ís have been subject to increased surveillance and harassment by government agencies and paramilitaries. This also coincided with a concerted media campaign by hardline news outlets which was aimed at defaming the basic tenets of the faith as well as incited hatred towards the group.

Silent strangulation

The Bahá'ís claim to be "the youngest of the world's independent religions" and believe that "humanity is one single race and that the day has come for its unification in one global peaceful society." Charges of apostasy being brought against them by the Islamic Republic essentially center on the fact that the Bahá'í Faith emerged out of the matrix of Islam, just as Christianity emerged from Judaism. Bahá'ís believe their founder, Baha'u'llah (1817-1892), is "the most recent in the line of Messengers of God that stretches back beyond recorded time and that includes Abraham, Moses, Buddha, Krishna, Zoroaster, Christ and Muhammad." Bahá'ís faced persecutions since the religion began in then mid-19th century Persia, but it was with Khomeini branding them "apostates" and members of a "political sect" that repression has become government policy.

Considering them as "unprotected infidels", the Islamic Republic systematically targets Bahá'ís in numerous ways. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports published by the UN Special Procedures, human rights violations manifested themselves during recent years as follows:

  • Expulsions from school and prohibition to attend universities. In several primary, middle and high schools in Iran, Bahá'í pupils have increasingly become subject to harassment and vilification. In 2006, a disclosed directive by the Ministry of Science to all universities states that is policy to prevent Bahá'ís from enrolling at higher education institutes and demands their expulsions if identified as such.
  • Violence against Bahá'ís by paramilitary groups, all of which operate within a framework of impunity. The most recent act of violence occurred in February 2007 when two elderly Bahá'í women were brutally murdered by allegedly Basij militia.
  • Arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without trial or charges being brought against Bahá'ís on the basis of their religious belief. When charges are made public before or during court proceedings, they refer to the promotion of anti-government propaganda.
  • Denial or confiscation of businesses and arbitrary dismissal or denial of work and pensions in general. By and large, Bahá'ís are neither protected by Iranian law nor given any rights as citizens under the Iranian constitution. Within this framework, Bahá'ís have been denied rightful inheritances, had their cemeteries and holy places desecrated and destroyed with impunity and their properties confiscated.

Does anyone care?

So, whilst the international community seems most alarmed by Iran's nuclear program and President Ahmadinejad's volatile anti-Semitism, the rise of concerted government sponsored anti- Bahá'í campaigns has largely gone unnoticed. Even though the US and the EU continue to condemn human rights violations, the fate of 36 imprisoned believers, counting the seven to face trial, and that of the community at large certainly does not rank high on any European or American agenda. In fact, President Obama's address to Iran on the occasion of the Iranian New Year was the first US presidential address which did not distinguish between the Iranian people and the regime, but rather addressed both. This much anticipated sea change in US foreign policy towards Iran indicates that the Obama administration is ridding itself from "regime change" rhetoric and seeks a gradual détente with Iran.

America's new found pragmatism vis-à-vis Iran will inevitably focus on diplomatic means to solve the stalemate over the nuclear issue and not question the nature of the regime. This is certainly good news for regional stability as, for the first time, the US and Iran could directly address mutual security concerns. However, as far as human security in Iran is concerned, the emerging bilateral diplomatic momentum largely sees issues of "freedom of religion and speech" as strategically inexpedient. Europe has also put human rights on a backburner and focuses solely on resuming nuclear talks.

Campaigns for the presidential elections in June 2009 are well underway. But unlike the 1997 elections, which were dominated by calls for democracy and the reformists' discourse on human rights and the rule of law, contenders of all factions center their bid on economic reform. Both agendas from the two high profile candidates from the reformist faction, former Speaker of the House, Mehdi Karrubi and former Prime Minister Mir-Hoseyn Musavi largely criticize Ahmadinejad's economic policies and management style. Even though both Karrubi and Musavi condemn the current president's perceived penchant for nepotism, corruption and violations of the rule of law, their main focus is economic and foreign policy. Musavi, in particular, made it clear that he dislikes "provoking the entire world for no reason and supports privatization policies". Given the dire state of Iran's economy, it seems that the electorate will react more favorably to reformist challengers abstaining from human rights and democratization rhetoric and instead promising détente with the West which would inherently pave the way for economic progress. Elections in Iran are notoriously hard to predict, but it seems evident whichever candidate succeeds in portraying himself as the crisis manager who could bring the country out of isolation is likely to win in June.

Conclusion: there is hope

Thus neither the West nor like-minded Iranian politicians are likely to put human rights on top of their immediate agendas. Given Iran's stepped up defense posture and unease about foreign funded plots to undermine the government, international democratization or human rights initiatives may well be counterproductive. For Iranian politicians, criticizing human rights violations has become more dangerous than ever before. Bahá'ís, as well as women, activists, journalists and other minorities are paying the ultimate price for this silence.

However, even though the seven Bahá'í leaders will be put on trial in secrecy, unable to defend themselves and are likely to be sentenced because of their religion, some do care: ordinary Iranians.

Shirin Ebadi's decision to defend the group represents a landmark as far as legal representation for Bahá'ís is concerned. Iranian lawyers have normally avoided representing Bahá'ís due to harassment and intimidation. Prior to this, Ayatollah Hassan-Ali Momtazero, the deposed heir apparent of the late Khomeinei, issued a fatwa which may well be the most important edict in support of Bahá'í rights. Responding to a question (estefta) about the legal status of Bahá'ís, Montazeri stated that they are not considered a religious minority in the Constitution; but because they are the residents of this country, they have territorial rights, and thus benefit from the rights of citizenship. Most significantly, on 3 February 2009, a letter called "We are Ashamed! A century and a half of oppression and silence is enough!" and now signed by over 260 Iranian public figures abroad and in Iran, called for an immediate end of the treatment of Bahá'ís.

The prospect of rapprochement between the US and Iran which could also solve the nuclear stalemate is certainly paramount to regional security, but it must not come at the expense of human security in Iran. What is being done to Iran's largest religious minority is too appalling to turn a blind eye to.

URL: http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/iran-a-faith-on-trial

Thursday, April 23, 2009

Rant against Hypocrisy by Robin Yassin-Kassab

I don’t quite know why, but hypocrisy is the element in political discourse which catalyses my most murderous responses. Perhaps it’s because I like language, or respect it, and believe it shouldn’t be raped.

I remember Tony Blair making a speech in Gaza in November 2001. This is when I realised for certain that he was not a mere fool but a dangerous and filthy murderer. Away from the hall and its selected attendees, for the visiting dignitary’s comfort, a demonstration against British Zionism was being violently suppressed. And at that very moment British warplanes were ravaging Afghan villages. And Blair lectured his audience, representatives of those who’d been hounded and attacked for six decades, in the following terms: What you people must understand, he squeaked, is that no cause, however just you think it may be, justifies violence. Not a flicker of irony nor a trace of self-doubt wrinkled his ugly face.

Read the rest of the post here>>

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

A Cyborg Manifesto by Donna Haraway

Donna Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York; Routledge, 1991), pp.149-181.


AN IRONIC DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR WOMEN IN THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

 This chapter is an effort to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism, and materialism. Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as reverent worship and identification. Blasphemy has always seemed to require taking things very seriously. I know no better stance to adopt from within the secular-religious, evangelical traditions of United States politics, including the politics of socialist feminism. Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community. Blasphemy is not apostasy. Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true. Irony is about humour and serious play. It is also a rhetorical strategy and a political method, one I would like to see more honoured within socialist-feminism. At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg.

 

A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction. The international women's movements have constructed 'women's experience', as well as uncovered or discovered this crucial collective object. This experience is a fiction and fact of the most crucial, political kind. Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of possibility. The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what counts as women's experience in the late twentieth century. This is a struggle over life and death, but the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion.

 

Contemporary science fiction is full of cyborgs - creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted.

 

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Modern medicine is also full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices, in an intimacy and with a power that was not generated in the history of sexuality. Cyborg 'sex' restores some of the lovely replicative baroque of ferns and invertebrates (such nice organic prophylactics against heterosexism). Cyborg replication is uncoupled from organic reproduction. Modern production seems like a dream of cyborg colonization work, a dream that makes the nightmare of Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984'sUS defence budget. I am making an argument for the cyborg as a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting some very fruitful couplings. Michael Foucault's biopolitics is a flaccid premonition of cyborg politics, a very open field.

 

By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. Ths cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation. In the traditions of 'Western' science and politics--the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other - the relation between organism and machine has been a border war. The stakes in the border war have been the territories of production, reproduction, and imagination. This chapter is an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction. It is also an effort to contribute to socialist-feminist culture and theory in a postmodernist, non-naturalist mode and in the utopian tradition of imagining a world without gender, which is perhaps a world without genesis, but maybe also a world without end. The cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history. Nor does it mark time on an oedipal calendar, attempting to heal the terrible cleavages of gender in an oral symbiotic utopia or post-oedipal apocalypse. As Zoe Sofoulis argues in her unpublished manuscript on Jacques Lacan, Melanie Klein, and nuclear culture, Lacklein, the most terrible and perhaps the most promising monsters in cyborg worlds are embodied in non-oedipal narratives with a different logic of repression, which we need to understand for our survival.

 

The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense - a 'final' irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic telos of the

 

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'West's' escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space. An origin story in the 'Western', humanist sense depends on the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate, the task of individual development and of history, the twin potent myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and Marxism. Hilary Klein has argued that both Marxism and psychoanalysis, in their concepts of labour and of individuation and gender formation, depend on the plot of original unity out of which difference must be produced and enlisted in a drama of escalating domination of woman/nature. The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in the Western sense. This is its illegitimate promise that might lead to subversion of its teleology as star wars.

 

The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a technological polls based partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. The rela-tionships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein's monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a restoration of the garden; that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The eyborg does not dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust. Perhaps that is why I want to see if eyborgs can subvert the apocalypse of returning to nuclear dust in the manic compulsion to name the Enemy. Cyborgs are not reverent; they do not re-member the cosmos. They are wary of holism, but needy for connection- they seem to have a natural feel for united front politics, but without the vanguard party. The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.

 

I will return to the science fiction of cyborgs at the end of this chapter, but now I want to signal three crucial boundary breakdowns that make the following political-fictional (political-scientific) analysis possible. By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, the boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not turned into amusement parks--language tool

 

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use, social behaviour, mental events, nothing really convincingly settles the separation of human and animal. And many people no longer feel the need for such a separation; indeed, many branches of feminist culture affirm the pleasure of connection of human and other living creatures. Movements for animal rights are not irrational denials of human uniqueness; they are a clear-sighted recognition of connection across the discredited breach of nature and culture. Biology and evolutionary theory over the last two centuries have simultaneously produced modern organisms as objects of knowledge and reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint trace re-etched in ideological struggle or professional disputes between life and social science. Within this framework, teaching modern Christian creationism should be fought as a form of child abuse.

 

Biological-determinist ideology is only one position opened up in scientific culture for arguing the meanings of human animality. There is much room for radical political people to contest the meanings of the breached boundary.2 The cyborg appears in myth precisely where the boundary between human and animal is transgressed. Far from signalling a walling off of people from other living beings, cyborgs signal distrurbingly and pleasurably tight coupling. Bestiality has a new status in this cycle of marriage exchange.

 

 

The second leaky distinction is between animal-human (organism) and machine. Pre-cybernetic machines could be haunted; there was always the spectre of the ghost in the machine. This dualism structured the dialogue between materialism and idealism that was settled by a dialectical progeny, called spirit or history, according to taste. But basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man's dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream. To think they were otherwise was paranoid. Now we are not so sure. Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and art)ficial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.

 

 

Technological determination is only one ideological space opened up by the reconceptions of machine and organism as coded texts through which we engage in the play of writing and reading the world.3 'Textualization' of everything in poststructuralist, postmodernist theory has been damned by Marxists and socialist feminists for its utopian disregard for the lived relations of domination that ground the 'play' of arbitrary reading.4 It is certainly true that postmodernist strategies, like my cyborg myth, subvert myriad organic wholes (for example, the poem, the primitive culture, the biological organism). In short, the certainty of what counts as nature -- a

 

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source of insight and promise of innocence -- is undermined, probably fatally. The transcendent authorization of interpretation is lost, and with it the ontology grounding 'Western' epistemology. But the alternative is not cynicism or faithlessness, that is, some version of abstract existence, like the accounts of technological determinism destroying 'man' by the 'machine' or 'meaningful political action' by the 'text'. Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival. Both chimpanzees and artefacts have politics, so why shouldn't we (de Waal, 1982; Winner, 1980)?

 

The third distinction is a subset of the second: the boundary between physical and non-physical is very imprecise for us. Pop physics books on the consequences of quantum theory and the indeterminacy principle are a kind of popular scientific equivalent to Harlequin romances* as a marker of radical change in American white heterosexuality: they get it wrong, but they are on the right subject. Modern machines are quintessentially microelectronic devices: they are everywhere and they are invisible. Modern machinery is an irreverent upstart god, mocking the Father's ubiquity and spirituality. The silicon chip is a surface for writing; it is etched in molecular scales disturbed only by atomic noise, the ultimate interference for nuclear scores. Writing, power, and technology are old partners in Western stories of the origin of civilization, but miniaturization has changed our experience of mechanism. Miniaturization has turned out to be about power; small is not so much beautiful as pre-eminently dangerous, as in cruise missiles. Contrast the TV sets of the 1950s or the news cameras of the 1970s with the TV wrist bands or hand-sized video cameras now advertised. Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum, and these machines are eminently portable, mobile -- a matter of immense human pain in Detroit and Singapore. People are nowhere near so fluid, being both material and opaque. Cyborgs are ether, quintessence.

 

The ubiquity and invisibility of cyborgs is precisely why these sunshine-belt machines are so deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially. They are about consciousness - or its simulation.5 They are floating signIfiers moving in pickup trucks across Europe, blocked more effectively by the witch-weavings of the displaced and so unnatural Greenham women, who read the cyborg webs of power so very well, than by the militant labour of older masculinist politics, whose natural constituency needs defence jobs. Ultimately the 'hardest' science is about the realm of greatest boundary confusion, the realm of pure number, pure spirit, C3I, cryptography, and the preservation of potent secrets. The new machines are so clean and light. Their engineers are sun-worshippers mediating a new scientific revolution

*The US equivalent of Mills & Boon.

 

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associated with the night dream of post-industrial society. The diseases evoked by these clean machines are 'no more' than the minuscule coding changes of an antigen in the immune system, 'no more' than the experience of stress. The nimble fingers of 'Oriental' women, the old fascination of little Anglo-Saxon Victorian girls with doll's houses, women's enforced attention to the small take on quite new dimensions in this world. There might be a cyborg Alice taking account of these new dimensions. Ironically, it might be the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing in Santa Rita jail* whose constructed unities will guide effective oppositional strategies.

 

So my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work. One of my premises is that most American socialists and feminists see deepened dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine, idealism and materialism in the social practices, symbolic formula-tions, and physical artefacts associated with 'high technology' and scientific culture. From One-DimensionalMan (Marcuse, 1964) to The Death of Nature (Merchant, 1980), the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance. Another of my premises is that the need for unity of people trying to resist world-wide intensification of domination has never been more acute. But a slightly perverse shift of perspective might better enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically mediated societies.

 

From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defence, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of war (Sofia, 1984). From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision produces worse illusions than double vision or many-headed monsters. Cyborg unities are monstrous and illegitimate; in our present political circumstances, we could hardly hope for more potent myths for resistance and recoupling. I like to imagine LAG, the Livermore Action Group, as a kind of cyborg society, dedicated to realistically converting the laboratories that most fiercely embody and spew out the tools

* A practice at once both spiritual and political that linked guards and arrested anti-nuclear demonstrators in the Alameda County jail in California in the early 1985.

 

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Of technological apocalypse, and committed to building a political form that acutally manages to hold together witches, engineers, elders, perverts, Christians, mothers, and Leninists long enough to disarm the state. Fission Impossible is the name of the affinity group in my town.(Affinity: related not by blood but by choice, the appeal of one chemical nuclear group for another, avidiy.)6

 

FRACTURED IDENTITIES

 

It has become difficult to name one's feminism by a single adjective -- or even to insist in every circumstance upon the noun. Consciousness of exclusion through naming is acute. Identities seem contradictory, partial, and strategic. With the hard-won recognition of their social and historical constitution, gender, race, and class cannot provide the basis for belief in 'essential' unity. There is nothing about teeing 'female' that naturally binds women. There is not even such a state as 'being' female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us by the terrible historica experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. And who counts as 'us' in my own rhetoric? Which identities are available to ground such a potent political myth called 'us', and what could motivate enlistment in this collectivity? Painful fragmentation among feminists (not to mention among women) along every possible fault line has made the concept of woman elusive, an excuse for the matrix of women's dominations of each other. For me - and for many who share a similar historical location in white, professional middle-class, female, radical, North American, mid-adult bodies - the sources of a crisis in political identity are legion. The recent history for much of the US left and US feminism has been a response to this kind of crisis by endless splitting and searches for a new essential unity. But there has also been a growing recognition of another response through coalition - affinity, not identity.7

 

Chela Sandoval (n.d., 1984), from a consideration of specific historical moments in the formation of the new political voice called women of colour, has theorized a hopeful model of political identity called 'oppositional consciousness', born of the skills for reading webs of power by those refused stable membership in the social categories of race, sex, or class. 'Women of color', a name contested at its origins by those whom it would incorporate, as well as a historical consciousness marking systematic breakdown of all the signs of Man in 'Western' traditions, constructs a kind of postmodernist identity out of otherness, difference, and specificity. This postmodernist identity is fully political, whatever might be said abut other possible postmodernisms. Sandoval's oppositional consciousness is about contradic-

 

 

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tory locations and heterochronic calendars, not about relativisms and pluralisms.

 

Sandoval emphasizes the lack of any essential criterion for identifying who is a woman of colour. She notes that the definition of the group has been by conscious appropriation of negation. For example, a Chicana or US black woman has not been able to speak as a woman or as a black person or as a Chicano. Thus, she was at the bottom of a cascade of negative identities, left out of even the privileged oppressed authorial categories called 'women and blacks', who claimed to make the important revolutions. The category 'woman' negated all non-white women; 'black' negated all non-black people, as well as all black women. But there was also no 'she', no singularity, but a sea of differences among US women who have affirmed their historical identity as US women of colour. This identity marks out a self-consciously constructed space that cannot affirm the capacity to act on the basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship.8 Unlike the 'woman' of some streams of the white women's movement in the United States, there is no naturalization of the matrix, or at least this is what Sandoval argues is uniquely available through the power of oppositional consciousness.

 

Sandoval's argument has to be seen as one potent formulation for feminists out of the world-wide development of anti-colonialist discourse; that is to say, discourse dissolving the 'West' and its highest product - the one who is not animal, barbarian, or woman; man, that is, the author of a cosmos called history. As orientalism is deconstructed politically and semiotically, the identities of the occident destabilize, including those of feminists.9 Sandoval argues that 'women of colour' have a chance to build an effective unity that does not replicate the imperializing, totalizing revolutionary subjects of previous Marxisms and feminisms which had not faced the consequences of the disorderly polyphony emerging from decolonization.

 

Katie King has emphasized the limits of identification and the political/ poetic mechanics of identification built into reading 'the poem', that generative core of cultural feminism. King criticizes the persistent tendency among contemporary feminists from different 'moments' or 'conversations' in feminist practice to taxonomize the women's movement to make one's own political tendencies appear to be the telos of the whole. These taxonomies tend to remake feminist history so that it appears to be an ideological struggle among coherent types persisting over time, especially those typical units called radical, liberal, and socialist-feminism. Literally, all other feminisms are either incorporated or marginalized, usually by building an explicit ontology and epistemology.10 Taxonomies of feminism produce epistemologies to police deviation from official women's experience. And of course, 'women's culture', like women of colour, is consciously created by

 

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mechanisms inducing affinity. The rituals of poetry, music, and certain forms of academic practice have been pre-eminent. The politics of race and culture in the US women's movements are intimately interwoven. The common achievement of King and Sandoval is learning how to craft a poetic/political unity without relying on a logic of appropriation, incorpora-tion, and taxonomic identification.

 

The theoretical and practical struggle against unity-through-domination or unity-through-incorporation ironically not only undermines the justifica-tions for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, essentialism, scient-ism, and other unlamented -isms, but all claims for an organic or natural standpoint. I think that radical and socialist/Marxist-feminisms have also undermined their/our own epistemological strategies and that this is a crucially valuable step in imagining possible unities. It remains to be seen whether all 'epistemologies' as Western political people have known them fail us in the task to build effective affinities.

 

It is important to note that the effort to construct revolutionary stand-points, epistemologies as achievements of people committed to changing the world, has been part of the process showing the limits of identification. The acid tools of postmodernist theory and the constructive tools of ontological discourse about revolutionary subjects might be seen as ironic allies in dissolving Western selves in the interests of survival. We are excruciatingly conscious of what it means to have a historically constituted body. But with the loss of innocence in our origin, there is no expulsion from the Garden either. Our politics lose the indulgence of guilt with the naivete of innocence. But what would another political myth for socialist-feminism look like? What kind of politics could embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of personal and collective selves and still be faithful, effective - and, ironically, socialist-feminist?

 

I do not know of any other time in history when there was greater need for political unity to confront effectively the dominations of 'race', 'gender', 'sexuality', and 'class'. I also do not know of any other time when the kind of unity we might help build could have been possible. None of 'us' have any longer the symbolic or material capability of dictating the shape of reality to any of'them'. Or at least 'we' cannot claim innocence from practicing such dominations. White women, including socialist feminists, discovered (that is, were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the category 'woman'. That consciousness changes the geography of all previous categories; it denatures them as heat denatures a fragile protein. Cyborg feminists have to argue that 'we' do not want any more natural matrix of unity and that no construction is whole. Innocence, and the corollary insistence on victimhood as the only ground for insight, has done enough damage. But the constructed revolutionary subject must give late-twentieth-

 

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century people pause as well. In the fraying of identities and in the reflexive strategies for constructing them, the possibility opens up for weaving something other than a shroud for the day after the apocalypse that so prophetically ends salvation history.

 

Both Marxist/socialist-feminisms and radical feminisms have simul-taneously naturalized and denatured the category 'woman' and conscious-ness of the social lives of 'women'. Perhaps a schematic caricature can highlight both kinds of moves. Marxian socialism is rooted in an analysis of wage labour which reveals class structure. The consequence of the wage relationship is systematic alienation, as the worker is dissociated from his (sic) product. Abstraction and illusion rule in knowledge, domination rules in practice. Labour is the pre-eminently privileged category enabling the Marxist to overcome illusion and find that point of view which is necessary for changing the world. Labour is the humanizing activity that makes man; labour is an ontological category permitting the knowledge of a subject, and so the knowledge of subjugation and alienation.

 

In faithful filiation, socialist-feminism advanced by allying itself with the basic analytic strategies of Marxism. The main achievement of both Marxist feminists and socialist feminists was to expand the category of labour to accommodate what (some) women did, even when the wage relation was subordinated to a more comprehensive view of labour under capitalist patriarchy. In particular, women's labour in the household and women's activity as mothers generally (that is, reproduction in the socialist-feminist sense), entered theory on the authority of analogy to the Marxian concept of labour. The unity of women here rests on an epistemology based on the ontological structure of'labour'. Marxist/socialist-feminism does not 'natur-alize' unity; it is a possible achievement based on a possible standpoint rooted in social relations. The essentializing move is in the ontological structure of labour or of its analogue, women's activity.11 The inheritance of Marxian humanism, with its pre-eminently Western self, is the difficulty for me. The contribution from these formulations has been the emphasis on the daily responsibility of real women to build unities, rather than to naturalize them.

 

Catherine MacKinnon's (198Z, 1987) version of radical feminism is itself a caricature of the appropriating, incorporating, totalizing tendencies of Western theories of identity grounding action.12 It is factually and politically wrong to assimilate all of the diverse 'moments' or 'conversations' in recent women's politics named radical feminism to MacKinnon's version. But the teleological logic of her theory shows how an epistemology and ontology - including their negations - erase or police difference. Only one of the effects of MacKinnon's theory is the rewriting of the history of the polymorphous field called radical feminism. The major effect is the production of a theory

 

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of experience, of women's identity, that is a kind of apocalypse for all revolutionary standpoints. That is, the totalization built into this tale of radical feminism achieves its end - the unity of women - by enforcing the experience of and testimony to radical non-being. As for the Marxist/ socialist feminist, consciousness is an achievement, not a natural fact. And MacKinnon's theory eliminates some of the difficulties built into humanist revolutionary subjects, but at the cost of radical reductionism.

 

MacKinnon argues that feminism necessarily adopted a different analyt-ical strategy from Marxism, looking first not at the structure of class, but at the structure of sex/gender and its generative relationship, men's constitu-tion and appropriation of women sexually. Ironically, MacKinnon's 'ontology' constructs a non-subject, a non-being. Another's desire, not the self's labour, is the origin of 'woman'. She therefore develops a theory of consciousness that enforces what can count as 'women's' experience - anything that names sexual violation, indeed, sex itself as far as 'women' can be concerned. Feminist practice is the construction of this form of consciousness; that is, the self-knowledge of a self-who-is-not.

 

Perversely, sexual appropriation in this feminism still has the epistemolo-gical status of labour; that is to say, the point from which an analysis able to contribute to changing the world must flow. But sexual object)fication, not alienation, is the consequence of the structure of sex/gender. In the realm of knowledge, the result of sexual objectification is illusion and abstraction. However, a woman is not simply alienated from her product, but in a deep sense does not exist as a subject, or even potential subject, since she owes her existence as a woman to sexual appropriation. To be constituted by another's desire is not the same thing as to be alienated in the violent separation of the labourer from his product.

 

MacKinnon's radical theory of experience is totalizing in the extreme; it does not so much marginalize as obliterate the authority of any other women's political speech and action. It is a totalization producing what Western patriarchy itself never succeeded in doing - feminists' consciousness of the non-existence of women, except as products of men's desire. I think MacKinnon correctly argues that no Marxian version of identity can firmly ground women's unity. But in solving the problem of the contradictions of any Western revolutionary subject for feminist purposes, she develops an even more authoritarian doctrine of experience. If my complaint about socialist/Marxian standpoints is their unintended erasure of polyvocal, unassimilable, radical difference made visible in anti-colonial discourse and practice, MacKinnon's intentional erasure of all difference through the device of the 'essential' non-existence of women is not reassuring.

 

In my taxonomy, which like any other taxonomy is a re-inscription of history, radical feminism can accommodate all the activities of women named by socialist feminists as forms of labour only if the activity can somehow be sexualized. Reproduction had different tones of meanings for the two tendencies, one rooted in labour, one in sex, both calling the consequences of domination and ignorance of social and personal reality 'false consciousness'.

 

Beyond either the diff~culties or the contributions in the argument of any one author, neither Marxist nor radical feminist points of view have tended to embrace the status of a partial explanation; both were regularly constituted as totalities. Western explanation has demanded as much; how else could the 'Western' author incorporate its others? Each tried to annex other forms of domination by expanding its basic categories through analogy, simple listing, or addition. Embarrassed silence about race among white radical and socialist feminists was one major, devastating political consequence. History and polyvocality disappear into political taxonomies that try to establish genealogies. There was no structural room for race (or for much else) in theory claiming to reveal the construction of the category woman and social group women as a unified or totalizable whole. The structure of my caricature looks like this:

 

socialist feminism--structure of class // wage labour // alienation labour, by analogy reproduction, by extension sex, by addition race radical feminism - structure of gender // sexual appropriation // objectification

sex, by analogy labour, by extension reproduction, by addition race

 

In another context, the French theorist, Julia Kristeva, claimed women appeared as a historical group after the Second World War, along with groups like youth. Her dates are doubtful; but we are now accustomed to remembering that as objects of knowledge and as historical actors, 'race' did not always exist, 'class' has a historical genesis, and 'homosexuals' are quite junior. It is no accident that the symbolic system of the family of man - and so the essence of woman - breaks up at the same moment that networks of connection among people on the planet are unprecedentedly multiple, pregnant, and complex. 'Advanced capitalism' is inadequate to convey the structure of this historical moment. In the 'Western' sense, the end of man is at stake. It is no accident that woman disintegrates into women in our time. Perhaps socialist feminists were not substantially guilty of producing essentialist theory that suppressed women's particularity and contradictory interests. I think we have been, at least through unreflective participation in the logics, languages, and practices of white humanism and through searching for a single ground of domination to secure our revolutionary voice. Now we have less excuse. But in the consciousness of our failures, we

 

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risk lapsing into boundless difference and giving up on the confusing task of making partial, real connection. Some differences are playful; some are poles of world historical systems of domination. 'Epistemology' is about knowing the difference.

 

THE INFORMATICS OF DOMINATION

 

In this attempt at an epistemological and political position, I would like to sketch a picture of possible unity, a picture indebted to socialist and feminist principles of design. The frame for my sketch is set by the extent and importance of rearrangements in world-wide social relations tied to science and technology. I argue for a politics rooted in claims about fundamental changes in the nature of class, race, and gender in an emerging system of world order analogous in its novelty and scope to that created by industrial capitalism; we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system--from all work to all play, a deadly game. Simultaneously material and ideological, the dichotomies may be expressed in the following chart of transitions from the comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the scary new networks I have called the informatics of domination:

RepresentationSimulation
Bourgeois novel, realismScience fiction, postmodernism
OrganismBiotic Component
Depth, integritySurface, boundary
HeatNoise
Biology as clinical practiceBiology as inscription
PhysiologyCommunications engineering
Small groupSubsystem
PerfectionOptimization
EugenicsPopulation Control
Decadence, Magic MountainObsolescence, Future Shock
HygieneStress Management
Microbiology, tuberculosisImmunology, AIDS
Organic division of labourErgonomics/cybernetics of labour
Functional specializationModular construction
ReproductionReplication
Organic sex role specializationOptimal genetic strategies
Bioogical determinismEvolutionary inertia, constraints
Community ecologyEcosystem
Racial chain of beingNeo-imperialism, United Nations humanism
Scientific management in home/factoryGlobal factory/Electronid cottage
Family/Market/FactoryWomen in the Integrated Circuit
Family wageComparable worth
Public/PrivateCyborg citizenship
Nature/Culturefields of difference
Co-operationCommunicatins enhancemenet
FreudLacan
SexGenetic engineering
labourRobotics
MindArtificial Intelligence
Second World WarStar Wars
White Capitalist PatriarchyInformatics of Domination

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This list suggests several interesting things.13 First, the objects on the right-hand side cannot be coded as 'natural', a realization that subverts naturalistic coding for the left-hand side as well. We cannot go back ideologically or materially. It's not just that igod'is dead; so is the 'goddess'. Or both are revivified in the worlds charged with microelectronic and biotechnological politics. In relation to objects like biotic components, one must not think in terms of essential properties, but in terms of design, boundary constraints, rates of flows, systems logics, costs of lowering constraints. Sexual reproduction is one kind of reproductive strategy among many, with costs and benefits as a function of the system environment. Ideologies of sexual reproduction can no longer reasonably call on notions of sex and sex role as organic aspects in natural objects like organisms and families. Such reasoning will be unmasked as irrational, and ironically corporate executives reading Playboy and anti-porn radical feminists will make strange bedfellows in jointly unmasking the irrationalism.

 

Likewise for race, ideologies about human diversity have to be formulated in terms of frequencies of parameters, like blood groups or intelligence scores. It is 'irrational' to invoke concepts like primitive and civilized. For liberals and radicals, the search for integrated social systems gives way to a new practice called 'experimental ethnography' in which an organic object dissipates in attention to the play of writing. At the level of ideology, we see translations of racism and colonialism into languages of development and under-development, rates and constraints of modernization. Any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and reassembly; no 'natural' architectures constrain system design. The financial districts in all the world's cities, as well as the export-processing and free-trade zones, proclaim this elementary fact of'late capitalism'. The entire universe of objects that can be known scientifically must be formulated as problems in

 

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communications engineering (for the managers) or theories of the text (for those who would resist). Both are cyborg semiologies.

 

One should expect control strategies to concentrate on boundary conditions and interfaces, on rates of flow across boundaries-- and not on the integrity of natural objects. 'Integrity' or 'sincerity' of the Western self gives way to decision procedures and expert systems. For example, control strategies applied to women's capacities to give birth to new human beings will be developed in the languages of population control and maximization of goal achievement for individual decision-makers. Control strategies will be formulated in terms of rates, costs of constraints, degrees of freedom. Human beings, like any other component or subsystem, must be localized in a system architecture whose basic modes of operation are probabilistic, statistical. No objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing signals in a common language. Exchange in this world transcends the universal translation effected by capitalist markets that Marx analysed so well. The privileged pathology affecting all kinds of components in this universe is stress - communications breakdown (Hogness, 1983). The cyborg is not subject to Foucault's biopolitics; the cyborg simulates politics, a much more potent field of operations.

 

This kind of analysis of scientific and cultural objects of knowledge which have appeared historically since the Second World War prepares us to notice some important inadequacies in feminist analysis which has proceeded as if the organic, hierarchical dualisms ordering discourse in 'the West' since Aristotle still ruled. They have been cannibalized, or as Zoe Sofia (Sofoulis) might put it, they have been 'techno-digested'. The dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized are all in question ideologically. The actual situation of women is their integration/ exploitation into a world system of production/reproduction and com-munication called the informatics of domination. The home, workplace, market, public arena, the body itself- all can be dispersed and interfaced in nearly infinite, polymorphous ways, with large consequences for women and others - consequences that themselves are very different for different people and which make potent oppositional international movements difficult to imagine and essential for survival. One important route for reconstructing socialist-feminist politics is through theory and practice addressed to the social relations of science and technology, including crucially the systems of myth and meanings structuring our imaginations. The cyborg is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the self feminists must code.

 

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Communications technologies and biotechnologies are the crucial tools recrafting our bodies. These tools embody and enforce new social relations for women world-wide. Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, i.e., as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and tool mutually constitute each other.

 

Furthermore, communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common move - the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange.

 

In communications sciences, the translation of the world into a problem in coding can be illustrated by looking at cybernetic (feedback-controlled) systems theories applied to telephone technology, computer design, weapons deployment, or data base construction and maintenance. In each case, solution to the key questions rests on a theory of language and control; the key operation is determining the rates, directions, and probabilities of flow of a quantity called information. The world is subdivided by boundaries differentially permeable to information. Information is just that kind of quantifiable element (unit, basis of unity) which allows universal translation, and so unhindered instrumental power (called effective communication). The biggest threat to such power is interruption of communication. Any system breakdown is a function of stress. The fundamentals of this technology can be condensed into the metaphor C31, command-controlcommunication-intelligence, the military's symbol for its operations theory.

 

In modern biologies, the translation of the world into a problem in coding can be illustrated by molecular genetics, ecology, sociobiological evolutionary theory, and immunobiology. The organism has been translated into prob-lems of genetic coding and read-out. Biotechnology, a writing technology, informs research broadly.14 In a sense, organisms have ceased to exist as objects of knowledge, giving way to biotic components, i.e., special kinds of information-processing devices. The analogous moves in ecology could be examined by probing the history and utility of the concept of the ecosystem. Immunobiology and associated medical practices are rich exemplars of the privilege of coding and recognition systems as objects of knowledge, as constructions of bodily reality for us. Biology here is a kind of cryptography. Research is necessarily a kind of intelligence activity. Ironies abound. A stressed system goes awry; its communication processes break down; it fails to recognize the difference between self and other. Human babies with

 

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baboon hearts evoke national ethical perplexity-- for animal rights activists at least as much as for the guardians of human purity. In the US gay men and intravenous drug users are the 'privileged' victims of an awful immune system disease that marks (inscribes on the body) confusion of boundaries and moral pollution (Treichler, 1987).

 

But these excursions into communications sciences and biology have been at a rarefied level; there is a mundane, largely economic reality to support my claim that these sciences and technologies indicate fundamental transforma-tions in the structure of the world for us. Communications technologies depend on electronics. Modern states, multinational corporations, military power, welfare state apparatuses, satellite systems, political processes, fabrication of our imaginations, labour-control systems, medical construc-tions of our bodies, commercial pornography, the international division of labour, and religious evangelism depend intimately upon electronics. Micro-electronics is the technical basis of simulacra; that is, of copies without originals.

 

Microelectronics mediates the translations of labour into robotics and word processing, sex into genetic engineering and reproductive technologies, and mind into artificial intelligence and decision procedures. The new biotechnologies concern more than human reproducdon. Biology as a powerful engineering science for redesigning materials and processes has revolutionary implications for industry, perhaps most obvious today in areas of fermentadon, agriculture, and energy. Communicadons sciences and biology are construcdons of natural-technical objects of knowledge in which the difference between machine and organism is thoroughly blurred; mind, body, and tool are on very intimate terms. The 'multinational' material organization of the production and reproduction of daily life and the symbolic organization of the production and reproduction of culture and imagination seem equally implicated. The boundary-maintaining images of base and superstructure, public and private, or material and ideal never seemed more feeble.

 

I have used Rachel Grossman's (1980) image of women in the integrated circuit to name the situation of women in a world so intimately restructured through the social relations of science and technology.15 I used the odd circumlocution, 'the social relations of science and technology', to indicate that we are not dealing with a technological determinism, but with a historical system depending upon structured relations among people. But the phrase should also indicate that science and technology provide fresh sources of power, that we need fresh sources of analysis and political action (Latour, 1984). Some of the rearrangements of race, sex, and class rooted in high-tech-facilitated social relations can make socialist-feminism more relevant to effective progressive politics.

 

 

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THE 'HOMEWORK ECONOMY' OUTSIDE 'THE HOME'

 

The 'New Industrial Revolution' is producing a new world-wide working class, as well as new sexualities and ethnicities. The extreme mobility of capital and the emerging international division of labour are intertwined with the emergence of new collecdvities, and the weakening of familiar groupings. These developments are neither gender- nor race-neutral. White men in advanced industrial societies have become newly vulnerable to permanent job loss, and women are not disappearing from the job rolls at the same rates as men. It is not simply that women in Third World countries are the preferred labour force for the science-based multinationals in the export-processing sectors, particularly in electronics. The picture is more systematic and involves reproduction, sexuality, culture, consumphon, and producdon. In the prototypical Silicon Valley, many women's lives have been structured around employment in electronics-dependent jobs, and their intimate realities include serial heterosexual monogamy, negotiating childcare, distance from extended kin or most other forms of traditional community, a high likelihood of loneliness and extreme economic vulnerability as they age. The ethnic and racial diversity of women in Silicon Valley structures a microcosm of conflicting differences in culture, family, religion, education, and language.

 

Richard Gordon has called this new situation the 'homework economy'.16 Although he includes the phenomenon of literal homework emerging in connecdon with electronics assembly, Gordon intends 'homework economy' to name a restructuring of work that broadly has the characteristics formerly ascribed to female jobs, jobs literally done only by women. Work is being redefined as both literally female and feminized, whether performed by men or women. To be feminized means to be made extremely vulnerable; able to be disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a reserve labour force; seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to dme arrangements on and off the paid job that make a mockery of a limited work day; leading an existence that always borders on being obscene, out of place, and reducible to sex. Deskilling is an old strategy newly applicable to formerly privileged workers. However, the homework economy does not refer only to large-scale deskilling, nor does it deny that new areas of high skill are emerging, even for women and men previously excluded from skilled employment. Rather, the concept indicates that factory, home, and market are integrated on a new scale and that the places of women are crucial - and need to be analysed for differences among women and for meanings for relations between men and women in various situations.

 

The homework economy as a world capitalist organizational structure is made possible by (not caused by) the new technologies. The success of the attack on relatively privileged, mostly white, men's unionized jobs is deaf to

 

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the power of the new communications technologies to integrate and control labour despite extensive dispersion and decentralization. The consequences of the new technologies are felt by women both in the loss of the family (male) wage (if they ever had access to this white privilege) and in the character of their own jobs, which are becoming capital-intensive; for example, office work and nursing.

 

The new economic and technological arrangements are also related to the collapsing welfare state and the ensuing intensification of demands on women to sustain daily life for themselves as well as for men, children, and old people. The feminization of poverty-- generated by dismantling the welfare state, by the homework economy where stable jobs become the exception, and sustained by the expectation that women's wages will not be matched by a male income for the support of children-- has become an urgent focus. The causes of various women-headed households are a function of race, class, or sexuality; but their increasing generality is a ground for coalitions of women on many issues. That women regularly sustain daily life partly as a funcdon of their enforced status as mothers is hardly new; the kind of integration with the overall capitalist and progressively war-based economy is new. The particular pressure, for example, on US black women, who have achieved an escape from (barely) paid domeshc service and who now hold clerical and similar jobs in large numbers, has large implicadons for condnued enforced black poverty with employment. Teenage women in industrializing areas of the Third World increasingly find themselves the sole or major source of a cash wage for their families, while access to land is ever more problemadc. These developments must have major consequences in the psychodynamics and politics of gender and race.

 

Within the framework of three major stages of capitalism (commercial/ early industrial, monopoly, multinational) --tied to nationalism, imperialism, and multinationalism, and related to Jameson's three dominant aesthetic periods of realism, modernism, and postmodernism --I would argue that specific forms of families dialectically relate to forms of capital and to its political and cultural concomitants. Although lived problematically and unequally, ideal forms of these families might be schematized as (1) the patriarchal nuclear family, structured by the dichotomy between public and private and accompanied by the white bourgeois ideology of separate spheres and nineteenth-century Anglo-American bourgeois feminism; (2) the modern family mediated (or enforced) by the welfare state and institutions like the family wage, with a flowering of a-feminist heterosexual ideologies, including their radical versions represented in Greenwich Village around the First World War; and (3) the 'family' of the homework economy with its oxymoronic structure of women-headed households and its explosion of feminisms and the paradoxical intensification and erosion of gender itself.

 

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This is the context in which the projections for world-wide structural unemployment stemming from the new technologies are part of the picture of the homework economy. As robodcs and related technologies put men out of work in 'developed' countries and exacerbate failure to generate male jobs in Third World 'development', and as the automated of fice becomes the rule even in labour-surplus countries, the feminization of work intensifies. Black women in the United States have long known what it looks like to face the structural underemployment ('feminization') of black men, as well as their own highly vulnerable position in the wage economy. It is no longer a secret that sexuality, reproduction, family, and community life are interwoven with this economic structure in myriad ways which have also differentiated the situations of white and black women. Many more women and men will contend with similar situations, which will make cross-gender and race alliances on issues of basic life support (with or without jobs) necessary, not just mice.

The new technologies also have a profound effect on hunger and on food production for subsistence world-wide. Rae Lessor Blumberg (1983) estimates that women produce about 50 per cent of the world's subsistence food.17 Women are excluded generally from benefiting from the increased high-tech commodification of food and energy crops, their days are made more arduous because their responsibilides to provide food do not diminish, and their reproductive situations are made more complex. Green Revolution technologies interact with other high-tech industrial production to alter gender divisions of labour and differential gender migration patterns.

 

The new technologies seem deeply involved in the forms of'privatization' that Ros Petchesky (1981) has analysed, in which militarization, right-wing family ideologies and policies, and intensified definitions of corporate (and state) property as private synergistically interact.18 The new communications technologies are fundamental to the eradication of 'public life' for everyone. This facilitates the mushrooming of a permanent high-tech military establishment at the cultural and economic expense of most people, but especially of women. Technologies like video games and highly miniaturized televi-sions seem crucial to production of modern forms of 'private life'. The culture of video games is heavily orientated to individual compedtion and extraterrestrial warfare. High-tech, gendered imaginations are produced here, imaginations that can contemplate destruction of the planet and a sci-fi escape from its consequences. More than our imaginations is militarized; and the other realities of electronic and nuclear warfare are inescapable. These are the technologies that promise ultimate mobility and perfect exchange-- and incidentally enable tourism, that perfect practice of mobility and exchange, to emerge as one of the world's largest single industries.

 

The new technologies affect the social relations of both sexuality and of

 

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reproduction, and not always in the same ways. The close ties of sexuality and instrumentality, of views of the body as a kind of private satisfaction- and utility-maximizing machine, are described nicely in sociobiological origin stories that stress a genetic calculus and explain the inevitable dialectic of domination of male and female gender roles.19 These sociobiological stories depend on a high-tech view of the body as a biotic component or cybernetic communications system. Among the many transformations of reproductive situations is the medical one, where women's bodies have boundaries newly permeable to both 'visualization' and 'intervention'. Of course, who controls the interpretation of bodily boundaries in medical hermeneubcs is a major feminist issue. The speculum served as an icon of women's claiming their bodies in the 1970S; that handcraft tool is inadequate to express our needed body politics in the negotiation of reality in the practices of cyborg reproduction. Self-help is not enough. The technologies of visualization recall the important cultural practice of hundng with the camera and the deeply predatory nature of a photographic consciousness.20 Sex, sexuality, and reproduction are central actors in high-tech myth systems structuring our imaginations of personal and social possibility.

 

Another critical aspect of the social relations of the new technologies is the reformulation of expectations, culture, work, and reproduction for the large scientific and technical work-force. A major social and political danger is the formation of a strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic groups, but especially people of colour, confined to a homework economy, illiteracy of several varieties, and general redundancy and impotence, controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses ranging from entertainment to surveillance and disappearance. An adequate socialist-feminist politics should address women in the privileged occupational categories, and particularly in the production of science and technology that constructs scientific-technical discourses, processes, and objects.21

 

This issue is only one aspect of enquiry into the possibility of a feminist science, but it is important. What kind of constitutive role in the production of knowledge, imagination, and practice can new groups doing science have? How can these groups be allied with progressive social and political movements? What kind of political accountability can be constructed to the women together across the scientific-technical hierarchies separating us? Might there be ways of developing feminist science/technology politics in alliance with and-military science facility conversion action groups? Many sciendfic and technical workers in Silicon Valley, the high-tech cowboys included, do not want to work on military science.22 Can these personal preferences and cultural tendencies be welded into progressive politics among this professional middle class in which women, including women of colour, are coming to be fairly numerous?

 

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WOMEN IN THE INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

 

Let me summarize the picture of women's historical locations in advanced industrial societies, as these positions have been restructured partly through the social relations of science and technology. If it was ever possible ideologically to characterize women's lives by the disdnction of public and private domains-- suggested by images of the division of working-class life into factory and home, of bourgeois life into market and home, and of gender existence into personal and political realms --it is now a totally misleading ideology, even to show how both terms of these dichotomies construct each other in practice and in theory. I prefer a network ideological image, suggesting the profusion of spaces and identities and the permeability of boundaries in the personal body and in the body politic. 'Networking' is both a feminist practice and a multinational corporate strategy -- weaving is for oppositional cyborgs.

 

So let me return to the earlier image of the informatics of domination and trace one vision of women's 'place' in the integrated circuit, touching only a few idealized social locations seen primarily from the point of view of advanced capitalist societies: Home, Market, Paid Work Place, State, School, Clinic-Hospital, and Church. Each of these idealized spaces is logically and practically implied in every other locus, perhaps analogous to a holographic photograph. I want to suggest the impact of the social relations mediated and enforced by the new technologies in order to help formulate needed analysis and practical work. However, there is no 'place' for women in these networks, only geometries of difference and contradiction crucial to women's cyborg identities. If we learn how to read these webs of power and social life, we might learn new couplings, new coalitions. There is no way to read the following list from a standpoint of'idendfication', of a unitary self. The issue is dispersion. The task is to survive in the diaspora.

 

Home: Women-headed households, serial monogamy, flight of men, old women alone, technology of domestic work, paid homework, re-emergence of home sweat-shops, home-based businesses and telecom-muting, electronic cottage, urban homelessness, migration, module architecture, reinforced (simulated) nuclear family, intense domestic violence.

 

Market: Women's continuing consumption work, newly targeted to buy the profusion of new production from the new technologies (especially as the competitive race among industrialized and industrializing nations to avoid dangerous mass unemployment necessitates finding ever bigger new markets for ever less clearly needed commodities); bimodal buying power, coupled with advertising targeting of the numerous affluent groups and neglect of the previous mass markets; growing importance of

 

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informal markets in labour and commodities parallel to high-tech, affluent market structures; surveillance systems through electronic funds transfer; intensified market abstraction (commodification) of experience, resulting in ineffective utopian or equivalent cynical theories of community; extreme mobility (abstraction) of marketing/financing systems; inter-penetration of sexual and labour markets; intensified sexualization of abstracted and alienated consumption.

 

Paid Work Place: Continued intense sexual and racial division of labour, but considerable growth of membership in privileged occupational categories for many white women and people of colour; impact of new technologies on women's work in clerical, service, manufacturing (especially textiles), agriculture, electronics; international restructuring of the working classes; development of new time arrangements to facilitate the homework economy (flex time, part time, over time, no time); homework and out work; increased pressures for two-tiered wage structures; significant numbers of people in cash-dependent populations world-wide with no experience or no further hope of stable employment; most labour 'marginal' or 'feminized'.

 

State: Continued erosion of the welfare state; decentralizations with increased surveillance and control; citizenship by telematics; imperialism and political power broadly in the form of information rich/information poor differentiation; increased high-tech militarization increasingly opposed by many social groups; reduction of civil service jobs as a result of the growing capital intensification of office work, with implications for occupational mobility for women of colour; growing privadzation of material and ideological life and culture; close integration of privatization and militarization, the high-tech forms of bourgeois capitalist personal and public life; invisibility of different social groups to each other, linked to psychological mechanisms of belief in abstract enemies.

 

School: Deepening coupling of high-tech capital needs and public educa-tion at all levels, differentiated by race, class, and gender; managerial classes involved in educational reform and refunding at the cost of

 

remaining progressive educational democratic structures for children and teachers; education for mass ignorance and repression in technocratic and militarized culture; growing and-science mystery cults in dissendng and radical political movements; continued relative scientific illiteracy among white women and people of colour; growing industrial direction of education (especially higher education) by science-based multinationals (particularly in electronics- and biotechnology-dependent companies); highly educated, numerous elites in a progressively bimodal society.

 

Clinic-hospital: Intensified machine-body relations; renegotiations of

 

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public metaphors which channel personal experience of the body, particularly in relation to reproduction, immune system functions, and 'stress' phenomena; intensification of reproductive politics in response to world historical implications of women's unrealized, potential control of their relation to reproduction; emergence of new, historically specific diseases; struggles over meanings and means of health in environments pervaded by high technology products and processes; continuing feminization of health work; intensified struggle over state responsibility for health; continued ideological role of popular health movements as a major form of American politics.

 

Church: Electronic fundamentalist 'super-saver' preachers solemnizing the union of electronic capital and automated fetish gods; intensified importance of churches in resisting the militarized state; central struggle over women's meanings and authority in religion; continued relevance of spirituality, intertwined with sex and health, in political struggle.

 

The only way to characterize the informatics of domination is as a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of subsistence networks for the most vulnerable. Since much of this picture interweaves with the social relations of science and technology, the urgency of a socialist-feminist politics addressed to science and technology is plain. There is much now being tione, and the grounds for political work are rich. For example, the efforts to develop forms of collecdve struggle for women in paid work, like SEIU's District 925,* should be a high priority for all of us. These efforts are profoundly deaf to technical restructuring of labour processes and reformations of working classes. These efforts also are providing understanding of a more comprehensive kind of labour organization, involving community, sexuality, and family issues never privileged in the largely white male industrial unions.

 

The structural rearrangements related to the social relations of science and technology evoke strong ambivalence. But it is not necessary to be uldmately depressed by the implications of late twentieth-century women's relation to all aspects of work, culture, production of knowledge, sexuality, and reproduction. For excellent reasons, most Marxisms see domination best and have trouble understanding what can only look like false consciousness and people's complicity in their own domination in late capitalism. It is crucial to remember that what is lost, perhaps especially from women's points of view, is often virulent forms of oppression, nostalgically naturalized in the face of current violation. Ambivalence towards the disrupted unides mediated by high-tech culture requires not sorting consciousness into categories of clear-sighted critique grounding a solid political epistemology'

 

*Service Employees International Union's office workers' organization in the US.

 

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versus 'manipulated false consciousness', but subtle understanding of emerging pleasures, experiences, and powers with serious potential for changing the rules of the game.

 

There are grounds for hope in the emerging bases for new kinds of unity across race, gender, and class, as these elementary units of socialist-feminist analysis themselves suffer protean transformations. Intensifications of hardship experienced world-wide in connection with the social relations of science and technology are severe. But what people are experiencing is not transparently clear, and we lack aufficiently subtle connections for collectively building effective theories of experience. Present efforts - Marxist, psychoanalytic, feminist, anthropological-- to clarify even 'our' experience are rudimentary.

 

I am conscious of the odd perspecdve provided by my historical position - a PhD in biology for an Irish Catholic girl was made possible by Sputnik's impact on US national science-education policy. I have a body and mind as much constructed by the post-Second World War arms race and cold war as by the women's movements. There are more grounds for hope in focusing on the contradictory effects of politics designed to produce loyal American technocrats, which also produced large numbers of dissidents, than in focusing on the present defeats.

 

The permanent pardality of feminist points of view has consequences for our expectations of forms of political organization and participation. We do not need a totality in order to work well. The feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams for a perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of experience, is a totalizing and imperialist one. In that sense, dialectics too is a dream language, longing to resolve contradiction. Perhaps, ironically, we can learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western logos. From the point of view of pleasure in these potent and taboo fusions, made inevitable by the social relations of science and technology, there might indeed be a feminist science.

 

CYBORGS: A MYTH OF POLITICAL IDENTITY

 

I want to conclude with a myth about idendty and boundaries which might inform late twentieth-century political imaginations (Plate 1). I am indebted in this story to writers like Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delany, John Varley, James Tiptree, Jr, Octavia Butler, Monique Wittig, and Vonda McIntyre.23 These are our story-tellers exploring what it means to be embodied in high-tech worlds. They are theorists for cyborgs. Exploring concephons of bodily boundaries and social order, the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966, 1970) should be credited with helping us to consciousness about how fundamental body imagery is to world view, and so to political language.

 

French feminists like Luce Irigaray and Monique Wittig, for all their differences, know how to write the body; how to weave eroticism, cosmology, and politics from imagery of embodiment, and especially for Wittig, from imagery of fragmentation and reconstitution of bodies.24

 

American radical feminists like Susan Griffnn, Audre Lorde, and Adrienne Rich have profoundly affected our political imaginations - and perhaps restricted too much what we allow as a friendly body and political language.25 They insist on the organic, opposing it to the technological. But their symbolic systems and the related positions of ecofeminism and feminist paganism, replete with organicisms, can only be understood in Sandoval's terms as oppositional ideologies fitting the late twentieth century. They would simply bewilder anyone not preoccupied with the machines and consciousness of late capitalism. In that sense they are part of the cyborg world. But there are also great riches for feminists in explicitly embracing the possibilides inherent in the breakdown of clean disdnctions between organism and machine and similar distinctions structuring the Western self. It is the simultaneity of breakdowns that cracks the matrices of domination and opens geometric possibilities. What might be learned from personal and political 'technological' pollution? I look briefly at two overlapping groups of texts for their insight into the construction of a potentially helpful cyborg myth: constructions of women of colour and monstrous selves in feminist science fiction.

 

Earlier I suggested that 'women of colour' might be understood as a cyborg idendty, a potent subjecdvity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities and in the complex political-historical layerings of her 'biomythography', Zami (Lorde, 1982; King, 1987a, 1987b). There are material and cultural grids mapping this potential, Audre Lorde (1984) captures the tone in the title of her Sister Outsider. In my political myth, Sister Outsider is the offshore woman, whom US workers, female and feminized, are supposed to regard as the enemy prevendug their solidarity, threatening their security. Onshore, inside the boundary of the United States, Sister Outsider is a potential amidst the races and ethnic identities of women manipulated for division, competition, and exploitation in the same industries. 'Women of colour' are the preferred labour force for the science-based industries, the real women for whom the world-wide sexual market, labour market, and politics of reproduction kaleidoscope into daily life. Young Korean women hired in the sex industry and in electronics assembly are recruited from high schools, educated for the integrated circuit. Literacy, especially in English, distinguishes the 'cheap' female labour so attractive to the multinationals.

 

Contrary to orientalist stereotypes of the 'oral primidve', literacy is a special mark of women of colour, acquired by US black women as well as

 

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men through a history of risking death to learn and to teach reading and wridng. Writing has a special significance for all colonized groups. Writing has been crucial to the Western myth of the distinction between oral and written cultures, primitive and civilized mentalities, and more recently to the erosion of that distinction in 'postmodernist' theories attacking the phallogo-centrism of the West, with its worship of the monotheistic, phallic, authoritative, and singular work, the unique and perfect name.26 Contests for the meanings of writing are a major form of contemporary political struggle. Releasing the play of writing is deadly serious. The poetry and stories of US women of colour are repeatedly about writing, about access to the power to signify; but this dme that power must be neither phallic nor innocent. Cyborg writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a once-upon-a-time wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other.

 

The tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories, cyborg authors subvert the central myths of origin of Western culture. We have all been colonized by those origin myths, with their longing for fulfilment in apocalypse. The phallogocentrie origin stories most crucial for feminist cyborgs are built into the literal technologies - teehnologies that write the world, biotechnology and microelectronics - that have recently textualized our bodies as code problems on the grid of C3I. Feminist cyborg stories have the task of recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command and control.

 

Figuratively and literally, language politics pervade the struggles of women of colour; and stories about language have a special power in the rich contemporary writing by US women of colour. For example, retellings of the stom~ of the indigenous woman Malinche, mother of the mesdzo 'bastard' race of the new world, master of languages, and mistress of Cortes, carry special meaning for Chicana constructions of identity. Cherrie Moraga (1983) in Loving in the War Years explores the themes of identity when one never possessed the original language, never told the original story, never resided in the harmony of legitimate heterosexuality in the garden of culture, and so cannot base identity on a myth or a fall from innocence and right to natural names, mother's or father's.27 Moraga's writing, her superb literacy, is presented in her poetry as the same kind of violation as Malinche's mastery of the conqueror's language -- a violation, an illegitimate production, that allows survival. Moraga's language is not 'whole'; it is self-consciously spliced, a chimera of English and Spanish, both conqueror's languages. But it is this chimeric monster, without claim to an original language before

 

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violation, that crafts the erode, competent, potent identities of women of colour. Sister Outsider hints at the possibility of world survival not because of her innocence, but because of her ability to live on the boundaries, to write without the founding myth of original wholeness, with its inescapable apocalypse of final return to a deathly oneness that Man has imagined to be the innocent and all-powerful Mother, freed at the End from another spiral of appropriation by her son. Writing marks Moraga's body, affirms it as the body of a woman of colour, against the possibility of passing into the unmarked category of the Anglo father or into the orientalist myth of 'original illiteracy' of a mother that never was. Malinche was mother here, not Eve before eating the forbidden fruit. Writing affirms Sister Outsider, not the Woman-before-the-Fall-into-Writing needed by the phallogocentric Family of Man.

 

Writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs, etched surfaces of the late twentieth century. Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate fusions of animal and machine. These are the couplings which make Man and Woman so problematic, subverting the structure of desire, the force imagined to generate language and gender, and so subverting the structure and modes of reproduction of 'Western' idendty, of nature and culture, of mirror and eye, slave and master, body and mind. 'We' did not originally choose to be cyborgs, but choice grounds a liberal politics and epistemology that imagines the reproduction of individuals before the wider replications of 'texts'.

 

From the perspective of cyborgs, freed of the need to ground politics in 'our' privileged position of the oppression that incorporates all other dominations, the innocence of the merely violated, the ground of those closer to nature, we can see powerful possibilities. Feminisms and Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions and/or a latent position of moral superiority, innocence, and greater closeness to nature. With no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis promising protection from hostile 'masculine' separation, but written into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize 'oneself' as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity, and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins and the importance of a mother like Malinche. Women of colour have transformed her from the evil mother of

 

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masculinist fear into the originally literate mother who teaches survival.

 

This is not just literary deconstruction, but liminal transformation. Every, story that begins with original innocence and privileges the return to wholeness imagines the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the birth of the self, the tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation; that is, war, tempered by imaginary respite in the bosom of the Other. These plots are ruled by a reproductive politics --rebirth without flaw, perfection, abstraction. In this plot women are imagined either better or worse off, but all agree they have less selflhood, weaker individuation, more fusion to the oral, to Mother, less at stake in masculine autonomy. But there is another route to having less at stake in masculine autonomy, a route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginaw. It passes through women and other present-tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological resources of victimization so as to have a real life. These cyborgs are the people who refuse to disappear on cue, no matter how many dmes a 'western' commentator remarks on the sad passing of another primitive, another organic group done in by 'Western' technology, by writing.28 These real-life cyborgs (for example, the Southeast Asian village women workers inJapanese and US electronics firms described by Aihwa Ong) are actively rewriting the texts of their bodies and sociedes. Sumival is the stakes in this play of readings.

 

To recapitulate, certain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals - in short, domination of all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self. Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/ made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, totaVpartial, God/man. The self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the semice of the other, the other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of domination, which gives the lie to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many.

 

High-tech culture challenges these dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine. It is not clear what is mind and what body in machines that resolve into coding practices. In so far as we know ourselves in both formal discourse (for example, biology) and in daily practice (for example, the homework economy in the integrated circuit), we find ourselves to be cyborgs, hybrids, mosaics, chimeras. Biological organisms have become biotic systems, com-

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munications devices like others. There is no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of machine and organism, of technical and organic. The replicant Rachel in the Ridley Scott film Blade Runner stands as the image of a cyborg culture's fear, love, and confusion.

 

One consequence is that our sense of connection to our tools is heightened. The trance state experienced by many computer users has become a staple of science-fiction film and cultural jokes. Perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices.29 Anne McCaffrey's pre-feminist The Ship Who Sang (1969) explored the consciousness of a cyborg, hybrid of girl's brain and complex machinery, formed after the birth of a severely handicapped child. Gender, sexuality, embodiment, skill: all were reconstituted in the story. Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin? From the seventeenth century dll now, machines could be animated - given ghostly souls to make them speak or move or to account for their orderly development and mental capacides. Or organisms could be mechan-ized - reduced to body understood as resource of mind. These machine/ organism relationships are obsolete, unnecessary. For us, in imagination and in other practice, machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves. We don't need organic holism to give impermeable whole-ness, the total woman and her feminist variants (mutants?). Let me conclude this point by a very partial reading of the logic of the cyborg monsters of my second group of texts, feminist science fiction.

 

The cyborgs populating feminist science fiction make very problematic the statuses of man or woman, human, artefact, member of a race, individual endty, or body. Katie King clarifies how pleasure in reading these fictions is not largely based on idendfication. Students facingJoanna Russ for the first time, students who have learned to take modernist writers like James Joyce or Virginia Woolf without flinching, do not know what to make of The Adventures of Alyx or The Female Man, where characters refuse the reader's search for innocent wholeness while granting the wish for heroic quests, exuberant eroticism, and serious politics. The Female Man is the story of four versions of one genotype, all of whom meet, but even taken together do not make a whole, resolve the dilemmas of violent moral action, or remove the growing scandal of gender. The feminist science fiction of Samuel R. Delany, especially Tales of Neveyon, mocks stories of origin by redoing the neolithic revolution, replaying the founding moves of Western civilization to subvert their plausibility. James Tiptree, Jr, an author whose fiction was regarded as particularly manly undl her 'true' gender was revealed, tells tales of reproduction based on non-mammalian technologies like alternation of generations of male brood pouches and male nurturing. John Varley

 

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constructs a supreme cyborg in his arch-feminist exploration of Gaea, a mad goddess-planet-trickster-old woman-technological device on whose surface an extraordinary array of post-cyborg symbioses are spawned. Octavia Butler writes of an African sorceress pithug her powers of transformation against the genetic manipulations of her rival (Wild Seed), of dme warps that bring a modern US black woman into slavery where her actions in relation to her white master-ancestor determine the possibility of her own birth (Kindred), and of the illegidmate insights into idendty and community of an adopted cross-species child who came to know the enem' as self (Survivor). In Dawn (1987), the first instalment of a series called Xenogenesis, Butler tells the story of Lilith Iyapo, whose personal name recalls Adam's first and repudiated wife and whose family name marks her status as the widow of the son of Nigerian immigrants to the US. A black woman and a mother whose child is dead, Lilith mediates the transformation of humanity through genetic exchange with extra-terrestrial lovers/rescuers/destroyers/genetic engineers, who reform earth's habitats after the nuclear holocaust and coerce surviving humans into intimate fusion with them. It is a novel that interrogates reproductive, linguishc, and nuclear politics in a mythic field structured by late twentieth-century race and gender.

 

Because it is particularly rich in boundary transgressions, Vonda McIn-tyre's Superluminal can close this truncated catalogue of promising and dangerous monsters who help redefine the pleasures and politics of embodiment and feminist writing. In a fiction where no character is 'simply' human, human status is highly problematic. Orca, a genetically altered diver, can speak with killer whales and survive deep ocean conditions, but she longs to explore space as a pilot, necessitating bionic implants jeopardizing her kinship with the divers and cetaceans. Transformations are effected by virus vectors carrying a new developmental code, by transplant surgery, by implants of microelectronic devices, by analogue doubles, and other means. Lacnea becomes a pilot by accepting a heart implant and a host of other alterations allowing survival in transit at speeds exceeding that of light. Radu Dracul survives a virus-caused plague in his outerworld planet to find himself with a time sense that changes the boundaries of spatial perception for the whole species. All the characters explore the limits of language; the dream of communicating experience; and the necessity of limitation, partiality, and indmacy even in this world of protean transformation and connection. Superluminal stands also for the defining contradictions of a cyborg world in another sense; it embodies textually the intersection of feminist theory and colonial discourse in the science fiction I have alluded to in this chapter. This is a conjunction with a long history that many 'First World' feminists have tried to repress, including myself in my readings of Superluminal before being called to account by Zoe Sofoulis,

 

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whose different location in the world system's informatics of domin-ation made her acutely alert to the imperialist moment of all science fiction cultures, including women's science fiction. From an Australian feminist sensitivity, Sofoulis remembered more readily McIntyre's role as writer of the adventures of Captain Kirk and Spock in TV's Star Trek series than her rewriting the romance in Superluminal.

 

Monsters have always defined the limits of community in Western imaginations. The Centaurs and Amazons of ancient Greece established the limits of the centred polls of the Greek male human by their disruption of marriage and boundary pollutions of the warrior with animality and woman. Unseparated twins and hermaphrodites were the confused human material in early modern France who grounded discourse on the natural and supernatural, medical and legal, portents and diseases -- all crucial to establishing modern identity.30 The evolutionary and behavioural sciences of monkeys and apes have marked the multiple boundaries of late twentieth-century industrial identities. Cyborg monsters in feminist science fiction define quite different political possibilities and limits from those proposed by the mundane fiction of Man and Woman.

 

There are several consequences to taking seriously the imagery of cyborgs as other than our enemies. Our bodies, ourselves; bodies are maps of power and identity. Cyborgs are no exception. A cyborg body is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end (or until the world ends); it takes irony for granted. One is too few, and two is only one possibility. Intense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an aspect of embodiment. The machine is not an it to be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines; they do not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they. Up till now (once upon a time), female embodiment seemed to be given, organic, necessary; and female embodiment seemed to mean skill in mothering and its metaphoric exten-sions. Only by being out of place could we take intense pleasure in machines, and then with excuses that this was organic activity after all, appropriate to females. Cyborgs might consider more seriously the partial, fluid, sometimes aspect of sex and sexual embodiment. Gender might not be global identity after all, even if it has profound historical breadth and depth.

 

The ideologically charged question of what counts as daily activity, as experience, can be approached by exploiting the cyborg image. Feminists have recently claimed that women are given to dailiness, that women more than men somehow sustain daily life, and so have a privileged epistemo-logical position potentially. There is a compelling aspect to this claim, one that makes visible unvalued female activity and names it as the ground of life.

 

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But the ground of life? What about all the ignorance of women, all the exclusions and failures of knowledge and skill? What about men's access to daily competence, to knowing how to build things, to take them apart, to play? What about other embodiments? Cyborg gender is a local possibility taking a global vengeance. Race, gender, and capital require a cyborg theory of wholes and parts. There is no drive in cyborgs to produce total theory, but there is an intimate experience of boundaries, their construction and deconstruction. There is a myth system waiting to become a political language to ground one way of looking at science and technology and challenging the informatics of domination-- in order to act potently.

 

One last image organisms and organismic, holistic politics depend on metaphors of rebirth and invariably call on the resources of reproductive sex. I would suggest that cyborgs have more to do with regeneration and are suspicious of the reproductive matrix and of most birthing. For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of structure and restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd topographical productions at the site of former injury. The regrown limb can be monstrous, duplicated, potent. We have all been injured, profoundly. We require regeneration, not rebirth, and the possibilities for our reconstitution include the utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous world without gender.

 

Cyborg imagery can help express two crucial arguments in this essay: first, the production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that misses most of reality, probably always, but certainly now; and second, taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of technology, and so means embracing the skilful task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in communication with all of our parts. It is not just that science and technology are possible means of great human satisfaction, as well as a matrix of complex dominations. Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an imagination of a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the supersavers of the new right. It means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories. Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess.

 

 


 

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Iran’s election and Iran’s system by Sanam Vakil & David Hayes

Iran’s election and Iran’s system

The anticipation of a vital presidential vote in Iran creates an expectation of change that political conditions may not satisfy, say Sanam Vakil & David Hayes.


The tenth presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose first round is held on 12 June 2009, promises to be a decisive event in the country's domestic and international politics. Indeed, the interplay between these two aspects is already evident as leading players and factions seek to position themselves in a way that will maximise public support - and perhaps equally important at this stage, define the agenda in ways that will benefit them. Of no one is this truer than Iran's incumbent president and candidate in the election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Sanam Vakil is a adjunct professorand visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. and Bologna, Italy 

David Hayes is deputy editor of openDemocracy                         
Also by Sanam Vakil inopenDemocracy:

"Iran's nuclear gamble" (1 February 2008) 

"Iran's hostage politics" (2 April 2007) 

"The Iran-American dialogue: enemies within" (4 June 2007) 

"Iran's political shadow-war" (16 July 2008)

The political signals emanating from the country are as mixed as ever in the present, fluid situation where domestic economic troubles combine with suggestions of a cautious opening to dialogue with the United States. At the same time it is important not to conflate these domestic and international issues and to remain clear-headed when analysing the prospects for change in Iranian policy.

The familiar combination of cautious progress and symbolic retreat in Iran's outward profile is evident in the events of March-April 2009. TheNowruz (new year) celebrations of 20 March were this year accompanied by a video-message from the United States president, Barack Obama, offering in a notably respectful tone a fresh start in relations between the two countries.  The reaction from the Iranian authorities, in particular the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was disbelieving without closing the door entirely. Meanwhile, at the United Nations-sponsored international conference at The Hague on 31 March, Obama's special envoy Richard Holbrooke is reported to have talked with Iran's deputy foreign minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhundzadeh in the highest-level meeting between the two countries' representatives for many years.

But any suggestion of a straightforward path to reconciliation is made even less plausible by the verdict of eight years' imprisonment delivered on 18 April to the journalist Roxana Saberi (who has dual American-Iranian nationality) on espionage charges. This type of legal persecution of a professional figure with roots both inside and outside the country is again familiar; the cases of (among many others) Zahra KazemiRamin JahanbeglooHaleh Esfandiari and Hossein Derakhshan exemplify a similar pattern with varying (and in Kazemi's case, tragic) results. At the same time, the verdict has provoked vigorous protest by the US government and others; and the fact that Iran's justice ministry has followed Ahmadinejad himself in saying that Saberi's lawyer, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, should be able to present the defence case in a "quick and fair appeal" offers a glimmer of hope for an early resolution.

If the Roxana Saberi case is one possible setback to diplomatic progress between Iran and the west, the United Nations anti-racism conference in Geneva on 20-24 April 2009 is another - and again Ahmadinejad is at the centre. His speech at the conference on 20 April outlining a standard litany of denunciation against Israel precipitated a walkout by western delegates, and reopened an issue of tension that first erupted with his announcements in 2005-07 in Tehran and New York (see Nasrin Alavi, "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's fear", 1 November 2005).

The president's project    

The international tensions resulting from Roxana Saberi's imprisonment and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric must also be seen in the light of the election campaign at home. The final stage of the campaign begins on 5-10 May, when the candidates must register with the interior ministry then await the Guardian Council's approval to run; there follows a month of opportunity for the leading reformist candidates - the most prominent of whom are Mehdi Karroubi (a former speaker of the majlis [parliament]) and Mir-Hossein Moussavi (prime minister during 1981-89, the critical years of the Iran-Iraq war) - to impress the voters, and more broadly to nudge the political pendulum back from the conservative, "principalist" side of President Ahmadinejad and in a more moderate direction.

It was the surprise election of the conservative candidate Mahmood Ahmadinejad in June 2005 that substantially changed the direction of Iran's domestic, regional and international relations. Ahmadinejad, who had served as mayor of Tehran but was until his arrival on the national stage relatively little known in the country (and certainly abroad), won his way to power mainly as an economic populist who promised to satisfy the material demands of Iran's poor urban and rural workers.  The combative and sharp style of leadership he has displayed contrasts greatly with his cooperative and mild-mannered predecessor, Mohammad Khatami (president 1997-2005).

Ahmadinejad has sought to return to what he and his supporters perceived as the lost values of the 1979 revolution: social justice, Islamic observance in the public sphere, and national independence. This has encompassed a defiant nuclear policy; the forging of closer relations with regional allies Hizbollah and Hamas, as well as proxy groups in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the building too of trading and energy links with China, Russia, and international partners in Latin America. This bold and sometimes confrontational policy has ensured that the these four years have been a bumpy ride for Iran and the world - but most analysts concur that Tehran's proactive strategy (greatly aided by the US having removed Iran's menacing enemies to the east [the Taliban] and west [Saddam Hussein]) has enhanced Iran's power in the wider region.

Ahmadinejad's move away from the flowery "dialogue of civilisations" proposed by Khatami has been reflected too in a hardline domestic stance involving a new national-security directive designed to restrain activities regarded as subversive. This has seen many civil-society groups - women, students, activists, workers, journalists, doctors, intellectuals, and in some cases political adversaries - subject to arrests and detentions. Both the margin of civic freedom and the atmosphere of hope for change that expanded under Khatami have narrowed, although civil-society movements remain active and many citizens continue to push against the boundaries.

But it is in the economic sphere rather than the political or diplomatic that many observers feel the election will be won and lost. Here, Ahmadinejad's record casts a greater shadow over his prospects for re-election if only because his initial pledges to meet the needs of Iran's poorer people can now be judged against his record in office. The populist leader began his term by saying that the oil money accumulating in government coffers would be returned to the people's tables.  Such munificence seemed plausible during the phase of steeply rising oil prices that followed - even if inflation and contradictory economic policies threatened to knock the promise off-track. But now, with oil prices hovering around $50 a barrel amid a global economic recession, the government can no longer afford earlier profligacy. 

Iran's economy, after all, is almost totally dependent on oil - it accounts for 80% of the country's foreign-exchange receipts, while oil and gas make up 70% of government revenue as a whole. Moreover, Iran must now grapple with sanctions imposed by the United States and the United Nations. The US sanctions ban American citizens from having commercial dealings with Iran, and prohibit oil and gas companies from investing in these Iranian industries. The UN sanctions, imposed as a result of Iran's civil-nuclear developments (including its uranium-enrichment programme, which some western analysts believe could be used in a weapon-building project) have isolated Iran without evidently curbing its ambitions or its access to resources (see Jan De Pauw, "Iran, the United States and Europe: the nuclear complex", 5 December 2007).

Ahmadinejad has attempted to resolve some of these problems via an "economic-reform plan" aimed at reducing dependence on oil revenues and tackling the country's inflation crisis. The plan would cut costly energy subsidies and redistribute a larger portion of the sum among citizens, but it has stalled amidst parliamentary opposition. This range of concerns makes the outcome of the June election even more important.

The system's constraints

The Iranian election season, condensed (unlike its United States counterpart) into a few months, approaches its climax with a number of reformists likely to be pitted against the conservative president (who may also face challenges on the conservative side). It is far from an equal contest in that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, who has continued to stand in solidarity with the president despite the growing cabal around the supreme leader who disapprove of Ahmadinejad's economic policies and confrontational stance. A number of polling and other indices suggest that Ahmadinejad has been losing support, but predictions about the result of Iran's elections have often been unreliable (not least in relation to the surprise victories of 1997 and 2005). It would be unwise to discount the president and his ability to rally votes outside of the urban centers (see Nasrin Alavi, "Iran: the waiting game", 24 March 2009).

The reformists will also be competing against one another, and for the right to progress to the second round run-off on 19 June (assuming no single candidate wins over 50% in the first round). Mohammad Khatami, for a long time expected to try to recover the presidency,withdrew his candidacy in favour of Mir-Hossein Moussavi; it is still possible that further consolidation might take place among the prominent remaining reformists (Mehdi Karroubi as well as Moussavi; another reformist, Abdullah Nouri, is being pressed by his supporters to run) so as to not dilute their potential votes.

The authority of the Iranian president is constrained within Iran's political and legislativesystem, both before the election (candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council) and after (since the supreme leader retains final authority over important decisions). These constraints apply especially to the president's influence over vital national-security issues. Much of the substance of Iran's international relations - with regard to US-Iran relations, Iran's regional profile and even its nuclear programme - has been less affected by having a particular president in Tehran than might appear to be the case. 

The implication of this view is that even the election of a reformist president may not by itself alter the direction of Iran's nuclear policy or its regional activities and links. In fact, the impact of a reformist victory might include a heightening of domestic struggles leading to a reversal of any conciliatory move; by the same token, it can be argued that a conservative victory by placating anxieties on the domestic front could allow for compromise in the international arena.

There is potential for change in Iran, but the lesson both of current institutional realities and of earlier periods of engagement between Iran and the west (particularly during Mohammad Khatami's tenure) is sobering. Whatever progress does take place - over the nuclear issue, regional relations and in domestic politics - will doubtless prove protracted and frustrating. After June 2009, there will still be use for the phrase "the more things change, the more they remain the same".

Friday, April 17, 2009

Dariush Ashouri on Modernity and Orientalism (amongst other things) and all without notes! (Farsi)

Part 1:



Part 2:



Part 3:

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Roger Cohen's Normalization Scenario for US-Iran Relations

Roger Cohen lays out a potential normalization scenario for US-Iranian relations in his latest artile in the New York Times.

"Here’s one normalization scenario:

Iran ceases military support for Hamas and Hezbollah; adopts a “Malaysian” approach to Israel (nonrecognition and noninterference); agrees to work for stability in Iraq and Afghanistan; accepts intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency verification of a limited nuclear program for peaceful ends only; promises to fight Qaeda terrorism; commits to improving its human rights record.

The United States commits itself to the Islamic Republic’s security and endorses its pivotal regional role; accepts Iran’s right to operate a limited enrichment facility with several hundred centrifuges for research purposes; agrees to Iran’s acquiring a new nuclear power reactor from the French; promises to back Iran’s entry into the World Trade Organization; returns seized Iranian assets; lifts all sanctions; and notes past Iranian statements that it will endorse a two-state solution acceptable to the Palestinians."

You can read the entire article here>>

Monday, April 13, 2009

SPIEGEL INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD

04/10/2009 05:59 PM

SPIEGEL INTERVIEW WITH IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD

'We Are Neither Obstinate nor Gullible'

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke with SPIEGEL about what he expects from US President Barack Obama, why America's new Afghanistan strategy is wrong and why Iran should have a spot on the UN Security Council.

SPIEGEL: Mr. President, so far you have traveled to the United States four times to attend the General Assembly of the United Nations. What is your impression of America and the Americans?

Ahmadinejad: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, I am pleased to be able to welcome you to Tehran once again, after our extensive conversation almost three years ago. Now on the USA: Of course, one cannot get to know a country like the United States in short visits, but my speech and the discussions at Columbia University were very special to me. I am quite aware that a distinction must be drawn between the American government and the American people. We do not hold Americans accountable for the faulty decisions of the Bush administration. They want to live in peace, like we all do.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says: "We have no interest in building a nuclear weapon."
REUTERS

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says: "We have no interest in building a nuclear weapon."

SPIEGEL: The new US president, Barack Obama, directed a video address to the Iranian nation three weeks ago, during the Iranian New Year festival. Did you watch the speech?

Ahmadinejad: Yes. Great things are happening in the United States. I believe that the Americans are in the process of initiating important developments.

SPIEGEL: How did you feel about the speech?

Ahmadinejad: Ambivalent. Some passages were new, while some repeated well-known positions. I thought it striking that Obama attached such high value to the Iranian civilization, our history and culture. It is also positive that he stresses mutual respect and honest interactions with one another as the basis of cooperation. In one segment of his speech, he says that a nation's standing in the world does not depend solely on weapons and military strength, which is precisely what we told the previous American administration. George W. Bush's big mistake was that he wanted to solve all problems militarily. The days are gone when a country can issue orders to other peoples. Today, mankind needs culture, ideas and logic.

SPIEGEL: What does that mean?

Ahmadinejad: We feel that Obama must now follow his words with actions.

SPIEGEL: The new US president, who has called your aggressive anti-Israeli remarks "disgusting," has nevertheless spoken of a new beginning in relations with Iran and extended his hand to you.

Ahmadinejad: I haven't understood Obama's comments quite that way. I pay attention to what he says today. But that is precisely where I see a lack of something decisive. What leads you to talk about a new beginning? Have there been any changes in American policy? We welcome changes, but they have yet to occur.

SPIEGEL: You are constantly making demands. But the truth is: Your policies, Iran's disastrous relations with the United States, are a burden on the global community and a threat to world peace. Where is your contribution to the easing of tensions?

Ahmadinejad: I have already explained this to you. We support talks on the basis of fairness and respect. That has always been our position. We are waiting for Obama to announce his plans, so that we can analyze them.

SPIEGEL: And that's all?

Ahmadinejad: We have to wait and see what Obama wants to do.

SPIEGEL: The world sees this differently, and we do too. Iran must act. Iran must now show good will.

Ahmadinejad: Where is this world you are talking about? What do we have to do? You are aware that we are not the ones who severed relations with America. America cut off relations with us. What do you expect from Iran now?

SPIEGEL: Concrete steps, or at least a gesture on your part.

Ahmadinejad: I have already answered that question. Washington cut off relations.

SPIEGEL: Are you saying that you would welcome a resumption of relations with the United States?

Ahmadinejad: What do you think? What has to happen? Which approach is the right one?

SPIEGEL: The world expects answers from you, not from us.

Ahmadinejad: But I sent a message to the new US president. It was a big step, a huge step. I congratulated him on his election victory, and I said a few things to him in my letter. This was done with care. We have been and continue to be interested in significant changes taking place. If we intend to resolve the problem between our two countries, it is important to recognize that Iran did not play a role in the development of this problem. The behavior of American administrations was the cause. If the behavior of the United States changes, we can expect to see important progress…

SPIEGEL: …that could lead to a resumption of diplomatic relations, perhaps even to the reopening of the embassy, which was occupied in 1979, the year of the revolution?

Ahmadinejad: We have not received an official request in this regard yet. If this happens, we will take a position on the matter. This is not a question of form. Fundamental changes must take place, to the benefit of all parties. The American government must finally learn lessons from the past.

SPIEGEL: But you should not?

Ahmadinejad: Everyone must learn from the past.

SPIEGEL: Then please tell us which lessons you are learning.

Ahmadinejad: We have been under pressure for the past 30 years, unfairly and without fault on our part. We have done nothing…

SPIEGEL: …according to you. The Americans see things quite a bit differently. The 444-day hostage crisis during which 50 US citizens were held from late 1979 until early 1981 in the US Embassy in Tehran is still a collective American trauma today.

Ahmadinejad: But think of the things that were done to Iranians! We were attacked by Iraq. Eight years of war. America and some European countries supported this aggression. We were even attacked with chemical weapons and your country, among others, aided and abetted those attacks. We did not inflict an injustice on anyone. We did not attack anyone, nor did we occupy other countries. We have no military presence in Europe and America. But troops from Europe and America are stationed along our borders.

SPIEGEL: The Western governments, including Germany's, are convinced that Iran supports terrorist organizations and that Iran has had dissidents killed abroad. Perhaps mistakes were not just made by the one side?

Ahmadinejad: Do you wish to imply that the troops are deployed along our borders because we allegedly support terrorist organizations?

SPIEGEL: We neither said nor implied that. But the accusation of support for terrorism has been made. Where is your constructive contribution?

Ahmadinejad: First of all: We do not commit terror, but we are victims of terror. After the revolution, our president and prime minister were killed in a bombing attack in the building adjacent to my office. Our faith forbids us from engaging in terrorism. And when it comes to the constructive contributions we are being asked to make, we have contributed to stabilization in both Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. While we were making these contributions, the Bush administration accused us of doing the opposite. Do you believe that problems can be solved with military force and invasion? Wasn't the strategy employed by America and NATO wrong from the start? We have always said that this is not the way to fight terrorists. They are stronger than ever today.

SPIEGEL: Again, we see no evidence of any self-criticism.

Ahmadinejad: Then why don't you tell me what mistakes we are supposed to have made. We have no interest in a historical settling of accounts.

SPIEGEL: You are not insisting that the Americans apologize for the 1953 CIA coup against the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh?

Ahmadinejad: We don't want to exact revenge. We merely want the Americans to correct their course. Do you truly see any signs that this is happening?

SPIEGEL: Yes, we do. George W. Bush declared Iran a member of the Axis of Evil and he threatened Tehran, at least indirectly, with regime change. There is no longer any mention of these things under Obama.

Ahmadinejad: There are changes in the choice of language. But that isn't enough. For the past 30 years, Germany and other European countries have been under pressure from the Americans not to improve their relations with Tehran. That's what all European statesmen tell us.

'All Peoples Are Fed Up with the American Government'

SPIEGEL: Is that what former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder said to you when you met with him here in Tehran in February?

Ahmadinejad: Yes, he said it, as well. We now hope to see concrete steps. This is good for everyone, but it is especially beneficial to the United States because the American position in the world is not exactly a good one. No one places any trust in the words of the Americans.

SPIEGEL: It is true that America's reputation in the world suffered under George W. Bush. But with all due respect, Mr. President, Iran's reputation has also suffered tremendously during your term in office.

Ahmadinejad: Where? With whom? With those in power or with the people? With which people and with which governments? During my more than three years in office, I have visited more than 60 countries, where I was received with great affection by both the people on the street and those in the government. We have the support of 118 countries in the Non-Aligned Movement. I agree that our reputation with the American government and some European governments is not positive. But that's their problem. All peoples are fed up with the American government.

SPIEGEL: But you are not even giving the new administration a chance. Your attitude is characterized by mistrust.

Ahmadinejad: We speak very respectfully of Barack Obama. But we are realists. We want to see real changes. In this connection, we are also interested in helping correct a faulty policy in Afghanistan.

SPIEGEL: What do you propose to do?

Ahmadinejad: Look, more than $250 billion (€190 billion) has been spent on the military campaign in Afghanistan to date. With a population of 30 million, that comes to more than $8,000 a person, or close to $42,000 for an average family of five. Factories and roads could have been built, universities established and fields cultivated for the Afghan people. If that had happened, would there have been any room left for terrorists? One has to address the root of the problem, not proceed against its branches. The solution for Afghanistan is not military, but humanitarian. It is to the West's advantage to listen to us, and if it does not, we wash our hands of the matter. We are merely observers. We deeply regret the loss of human life, no matter whose lives are lost. This is just as applicable to Afghan civilians as it is to the military forces that have intervened.

SPIEGEL: That doesn't sound at all like you have any interest in helping the Americans and NATO fight the Taliban. Obama is placing more emphasis on civilian reconstruction, but he also believes that radicals who seek to stand in the way of this reconstruction must be dealt with militarily.

Ahmadinejad: I am telling you now that Obama's new policy is wrong. The Americans are not familiar with the region, and the perceptions of the NATO commanders are mistaken. I am telling you this as a trained teacher: This is wrong. As far as the $250 billion is concerned: If the money had been spent in America, perhaps it would have solved the problem of unemployment, at least in part. And perhaps there would be no economic crisis today.

SPIEGEL: Are you seriously insisting on an American withdrawal from the region?

Ahmadinejad: One has to have a plan, of course. A withdrawal can only be one of several measures. It must be accompanied by other, simultaneous actions, such as strengthening regional government. Do you know that narcotics production has grown fivefold under the NATO command in Afghanistan? Narcotics! That kills people. We have lost more than 3,300 people in the fight against drug smuggling. Our police force made these sacrifices while guarding our 1,000-kilometer border with Afghanistan.

SPIEGEL: Iran has always been opposed to the Taliban. But its return to power cannot be prevented without military force.

Ahmadinejad: The people should be given the power. This requires economic aid, as well as a clear political process. The Afghan government should have been given more responsibility in the last seven years. President Hamid Karzai said to me once: They don't allow us to do our work.

SPIEGEL: Everyone, including the Americans, stresses that the people must be respected. Obama and NATO have agreed to a comprehensive list of measures for Afghanistan and they are banking on Iran supporting these measures, out of an interest in a stabile Afghanistan. Do you intend to refuse all cooperation?

Ahmadinejad: I believe that the right approach to looking into such an option is the diplomatic path. You are journalists, not representatives of NATO, which is why I will not explain my position to you in this regard. If we receive a request through diplomatic channels, we will respond to it.

SPIEGEL: But some politicians in Tehran fear contact with America. According to US officials, your deputy foreign minister, Mohammed Mehdi Ahundzadeh, shook hands with US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke at the Afghanistan conference in The Hague last week, but then the Iranian foreign ministry vehemently denied the encounter. How can we have any faith in your willingness to cooperate if a harmless handshake presents a problem to you?

Ahmadinejad: I don't think that this is truly relevant. A handshake, a pleasantry, this is not a problem in my view.

SPIEGEL: You are downplaying it. But perhaps there is more to the turmoil over the handshake than meets the eye. Perhaps it is a symbol of how deep the divide is between Tehran and Washington -- and of the fact that you are actually unwilling to do without your favorite archenemy.

Ahmadinejad: Naturally, we cannot expect to see problems that have arisen over more than half a century resolved in only a few days. We are neither obstinate nor gullible. We are realists. The important thing is the determination to bring about improvements. If you change the atmosphere, solutions can be found.

SPIEGEL: Do you, like the Americans, distinguish between the incorrigible Taliban, who must be opposed, and moderate Taliban, with whom talks are possible?

Ahmadinejad: I would not venture a conclusive verdict in this regard. I don't know what is meant by that. Don't forget, the Afghan people have close historical ties to Iran. More than 3 million Afghan citizens live in our country. And because we are also friendly with the Germans, I repeat: A stronger military presence is not a solution.

SPIEGEL: Are you concerned about German soldiers in Afghanistan?

Ahmadinejad: We also love the Germans. We are concerned.

SPIEGEL: And yet you ignore the consequences.

Ahmadinejad: No. If something is explained to us in a logical way, we accept it. We negotiated with Americans in Iraq, even though it contradicted our basic principle of not talking to the Americans. We did it for the sake of the matter, within the context of clear logic.

SPIEGEL: If the American troops withdraw from Iraq, the security situation there will presumably deteriorate dramatically. Will you fill the power vacuum in neighboring Iraq, where your fellow Shiites make up two-thirds of the population? Do you advocate the establishment of a theocracy, an Islamic Republic of Iraq?

Ahmadinejad: We believe that the Iraqi people are capable of providing for their own security. The Iraqi people have a civilization that goes back more than 1,000 years. We will support whatever the Iraqis decide to do and which form of government they choose. A sovereign, united and strong Iraq is beneficial for everyone. We would welcome that.

SPIEGEL: American intelligence services have concluded that Tehran plays an entirely different role in Iraq. The CIA claims that Iran is stirring up resistance to US troops through the Shiite militias.

Ahmadinejad: We pay no attention to the reports of American intelligence services. The Americans occupied Iraq and are responsible for its security. In the past, they sought to divert attention away from their own failures by holding us responsible for the unrest. They must correct their own mistakes. Things have improved for the Americans since they recognized this and began to respect the Iraqi people. Our relations with Baghdad are very close. We fully support the Iraqi government. As always, our policies are completely transparent.

SPIEGEL: Mr. President, that is not true. You oppose the world's most important nations in one of the central international conflicts. Iran is strongly suspected of building a nuclear bomb under the guise of civilian research. Only recently, US President Obama warned of this very real danger during his visit to Europe. There are four UN resolutions calling upon Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities. Why do you not finally comply with this demand?

'We Are Concerned and Deeply Mistrustful'

Ahmadinejad: What do you mean by that?

SPIEGEL: Mr. President, we mean that the world is waiting for a sign from you, that we are waiting for a sign. Why do you not at least temporarily suspend uranium enrichment, thereby laying the groundwork for the commencement of serious negotiations?

Ahmadinejad: These discussions are outdated. The time for that is over. The 118 members of the Non-Aligned Movement support us unanimously, as do the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. If we eliminate duplication between the two groups, we have 125 countries that are on our side. If a few countries are opposed to us, you certainly cannot claim that this is the entire world.

SPIEGEL: We are talking about Europe and the United States, where not a single politician wants to meet with you. Senior Italian politicians avoided you at a UN conference in Rome last year.

Ahmadinejad: We see that too, of course. But we are saying that Europe is not the whole world. Why do you believe this? Besides, I didn't even want to meet the Italian politicians.

SPIEGEL: Even if you refuse to believe it, the most important international body, the United Nations Security Council, is often unanimously opposed to you. Not just the Western powers, but also China and Russia have already approved sanctions against Iran.

Ahmadinejad: Allow me to set things straight, both legally and politically. At least 10 members of the UN Security Council…

SPIEGEL: …which includes, in addition to the permanent members, US, Russia, Great Britain, France and China, 10 elected representatives based on a rotating principle…

Ahmadinejad: …have told us that they only voted against us under American and British pressure. Many have said so in this very room. What value is there to consent under pressure? We consider this to be legally irrelevant. Politically speaking, we believe that this is not the way to run the world. All peoples must be respected, and they must all be granted the same rights.

SPIEGEL: What right does Iran feel deprived of?

Ahmadinejad: If a technology is beneficial, everyone should have it. If it is not, no one should have it. Can it be that America has 5,400 nuclear warheads and Germany has none? And that we are not even permitted to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy? Our logic is completely clear: equal rights for all. The composition of the Security Council and the veto of its five permanent members are consequences of World War II, which ended 60 years ago. Must the victorious powers dominate mankind for evermore, and must they constitute the world government? The composition of the Security Council must be changed.

SPIEGEL: You are referring to India, Germany, South Africa? Should Iran also be a permanent member of the Security Council?

Ahmadinejad: If things were done fairly in the world, Iran would also have to be a member of the Security Council. We do not accept the notion that a handful of countries see themselves as the masters of the world. They should open their eyes and recognize real conditions.

SPIEGEL: Those real conditions include your refusal to abandon your nuclear program, despite international pressure. Does this mean that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, can save themselves the trouble of holding talks with Iran? Will uranium enrichment not be discontinued under any circumstances?

Ahmadinejad: I believe that they already reached this conclusion in Vienna. Why did we become a member of the IAEA? It was so that we could use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. When a country becomes a member of an international organization, must it only do its homework or is it also entitled to rights? What assistance have we received from the IAEA? Did it provide us with any know-how or knowledge? No. But according to its statutes, it would have been required to do so. Instead, it simply executed instructions coming from America.

SPIEGEL: With all due respect, Mr. President, Iran has concealed, tricked and misled, thereby arousing the world's suspicions. Unfortunately, the suspicion that you are abusing your rights and secretly developing a bomb is not so far fetched.

Ahmadinejad: Where did we use trickery? That's a huge lie! We cooperated with the Atomic Energy Agency. And besides, wasn't the IAEA founded so that the nuclear powers would disarm? Where are the reports that document who has disarmed, and to what extent? It simply has not happened. We are concerned, and we are deeply mistrustful.

SPIEGEL: The world distrusts you, and the world's greatest concern is that you are building the bomb, because you feel surrounded by nuclear powers, the United States, India and Pakistan, and not least because Israel possesses the bomb.

Ahmadinejad: We have no interest in building a nuclear weapon. We have sent the IAEA thousands of pages of reports and made thousands of hours of inspections possible. The IAEA cameras monitor our activities. Who is dangerous, and whom should the inspectors distrust? Those who secretly built the bomb, or us, who are cooperating with the IAEA?

SPIEGEL: One can certainly not speak of a true willingness to cooperate on your part. Director General ElBaradei has repeatedly said this in our conversations and this is also documented in publicly-available IAEA reports.

Ahmadinejad: Allow me to make two final observations regarding the nuclear dispute. First, as long as there is no justice, there can be no solution. One cannot measure the world with a double standard -- that was Mr. Bush's big mistake. The Americans should not make the same mistake again. We say: We are willing to cooperate under fair conditions. The same conditions, and on a level playing field. The second observation concerns the warmongers and Zionists …

SPIEGEL: … your eternal enemy of convenience …

Ahmadinejad: …whose existence thrives on tension and who have become rich through war. And then there is a third group, the intolerant, those who are only interested in power. Mr. Obama's biggest problem has to do with domestic policy. On the one hand, America needs Iran and must newly realign itself. On the other hand, the new US president is under pressure from these groups. Courageous decisions are needed, and the ball is in Obama's court.

SPIEGEL: Until recently, your views about America included the conviction that a black man could never become president of the United States. Is it possible that you have a faulty and completely distorted image of America?

Ahmadinejad: No, it wasn't the way you describe it. We hope that the changes in American policy are of a fundamental nature, and that more has changed than the color. And that American policy will become more equitable, for the benefit of Africa, Asia and, most of all, the Middle East.

SPIEGEL: You have become one of the most powerful political players in the region because you have become a champion of the Palestinian cause.

Ahmadinejad: We are defending more than the basic rights of oppressed Palestinians. Our proposal for resolving the Middle East conflict is that the Palestinians should be allowed to decide their own future in a free referendum. Do you think it right that some European countries and the United States support the occupying regime and the unnatural Zionist state, but condemn Iran, merely because we are defending the rights of the Palestinian people?

SPIEGEL: You are talking about Israel, a member of the United Nations that has been recognized worldwide for many decades. What would you do if a majority of the Palestinians voted for a two-state solution, that is, if they recognized Israel's right to exist?

Ahmadinejad: If that were what they decided, everyone would have to accept this decision…

SPIEGEL: …and you too would have to recognize Israel, a country that you have said, in the past, you would like to "wipe off the map." Please tell us exactly what you said and what you meant by it.

Ahmadinejad: Let me put it this way, facetiously: Why did the Germans cause so much trouble back then, allowing these problems to arise in the first place? The Zionist regime is the result of World War II. What does any of this have to do with the Palestinian people? Or with the Middle East region? I believe that we must get to the root of the problem. If one doesn't consider the causes, there can be no solution.

SPIEGEL: Does getting to the root of the problem mean wiping out Israel?

Ahmadinejad: It means claiming the rights of the Palestinian people. I believe that this is to everyone's benefit, to that of America, Europe and Germany. But didn't we want to discuss Germany and German-Iranian relations?

SPIEGEL: That's what we are talking about. The fact that you deny Israel's right to exist is of critical importance when it comes to German-Iranian relations.

Ahmadinejad: Do you believe that the German people support the Zionist regime? Do you believe that a referendum could be held in Germany on this question? If you did allow such a referendum to take place, you would discover that the German people hate the Zionist regime.

SPIEGEL: We are confident that this is not the case.

Ahmadinejad: I do not believe that the European countries would have been as indulgent if only one-hundredth of the crimes that the Zionist regime has committed in Gaza had happened somewhere in Europe. Why on earth do the European governments support this regime? I have already tried to explain this to you once before…

SPIEGEL: …when we argued about your denial of the Holocaust three years ago. After the interview, we sent you a film by SPIEGEL TV about the extermination of the Jews in the Third Reich. Did you receive the DVD about the Holocaust, and did you watch it?

Ahmadinejad: Yes, I did receive the DVD. But I did not want to respond to you on this question. I believe that the controversy over the Holocaust is not an issue for the German people. The problem is more deep-seated than that. By the way, thank you once again for coming. You are Germans, and we think very highly of the Germans.

SPIEGEL: Do you have a message for the German government?

Ahmadinejad: I sent a letter to Ms. Merkel three years ago, in which I emphasized the importance of our historical cultural and economic relations and called upon Germany to exercise more independence.

SPIEGEL: There will be a presidential election in Iran on June 12. You are considered the favorite. Are you going to win?

Ahmadinejad: Let's see what happens. Nine weeks is a long time. In our country, there are no winners and, therefore, no real losers.

SPIEGEL: If you are reelected, will you be the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran to shake the hand of an American president?

Ahmadinejad: What do you mean?

SPIEGEL: Mr. President, thank you for the interview.

Interview conducted by Dieter Bednarz, Erich Follath and Georg Mascolo

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan


Akbar Ganji in conversation with Charles Taylor


A Secular Age:

Akbar Ganji in conversation with Charles Taylor

posted by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel

[Following the introduction below by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, we are posting excerpts from a dialoguebetween Akbar Ganji and Charles Taylor. The interview took place over two days in April of 2007, at Northwestern University. It was translated by Ahmad Sadri, transcribed by Morteza Dehghani and will appear at the end of a Persian translation of Taylor's Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited, for which Taylor has written a new foreword for his Iranian readers. Readers can download the full English transcript of the dialogue here. For more background on Akbar Ganji see his website.ed.]

Akbar Ganji is Iran’s preeminent political dissident. A heroic figure to the democratic movement in Iran, he has been likened to Gandhi and Mandela. The London-based human rights organization, Article 19, has described Ganji as the “Iranian Vaclav Havel.” He has been the recipient of over a dozen human rights, press freedom and pro-democracy awards.

Ganji was born into a religious family in 1960, in a poor district of south Tehran. Like many young Iranians of his generation, he was a fierce critic of the US-backed monarchy and an enthusiastic supporter of Ayatullah Khomeini and Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. In the early 1980s he became a member of the new government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and was subsequently employed in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. But like many revolutionaries, Ganji became increasingly disillusioned with the path his country’s revolution was taking, and his thinking underwent a gradual metamorphosis. He channeled his growing frustration with the post-revolutionary status quo into journalism. By the late 1990s he had emerged as Iran’s leading investigative reporter, having produced a body of writing critical of the regime’s suppression of human rights and crackdown on dissent.

Ganji published these reports in a variety of pro-democracy newspapers (such as Sobh-e EmroozKhordad, and Fath), most of which were shut down in the conservative clerical crackdown on Iran’s reform movement. He became a household name after the publication of two best-selling books, Tarik khaneye Ashbah (Dungeon of Ghosts, 1999) and Alijenob Sorkhpoosh va Alijenob-e Khakestari (The Red Eminence and the Grey Eminences, 2000). The former has been described by the Washington Post as “the Iranian equivalent of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago.” His books exposed the dark side of authoritarian clerical rule, focusing on the nefarious role of senior religious leaders in the serial murders of Iranian writers and intellectuals. In these books Ganji also exposed the attempt by clerical hardliners to suffocate the free debate and expression which blossomed in the first term of Muhammad Khatami’s reformist presidency (1997-2001). These widely-reads books seriously damaged the reputation of former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani and contributed to the defeat of the conservatives in the parliamentary elections of February 2000.

In April of 2000, Ganji was arrested upon his return to Iran from an academic conference in Berlin. In January of 2001, he was sentenced to 10 years in jail and to five years internal exile (upon appeal he was given a six-year sentence and banned for life from working as a journalist). His six-year prison sentence—which he served out in full—ended in March of 2006. Following in the footsteps of Mandela, Havel and Martin Luther King, Jr., Ganji took to writing from his prison cell. His political manifestos and open letters were smuggled out of jail and published on the internet, sparking an intense debate among Iranians about the future of their country.

In 2005, his last year in prison, Ganji went on a hunger strike that lasted from May to August. His hunger strike mobilized the international human rights community, including eight former Nobel Peace laureates. Thousands of intellectuals and human rights activists around the world spoke out on his behalf. It is generally believed that the global support generated for Ganji during this period spared his life.

In June of 2006 Ganji left Iran. He has been writing and giving talks in Europe and North America, raising awareness about the struggle for democracy in his country, and also advocating against a U.S. military attack on Iran. A handful of these writings were published in April of 2008 under the title The Road to Democracy in Iran (MIT Press). It is the sole volume of Ganji’s voluminous writings in English translation. Despite repeated invitations he has refused to meet with any member of the Bush Administration, on the principle that the struggle for democracy in Iran must be waged from within the country, without foreign governmental support. His interlocutors have consisted exclusively of human rights groups, civil society organizations, journalists, members of the Iranian diaspora community and Western intellectuals. To date he has met and engaged in dialogue with Jürgen Habermas, Robert Bellah, David Held, Ronald Dworkin, Noam Chomsky, Seyla Benhabib, Michael Sandel, Nancy Fraser, Martha Nussbaum, Marshall Berman, Alasdair MacIntrye, the late Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor.

His interest in meeting with these figures has been twofold. First, he would like to introduce the ideas of leading Western thinkers to an Iranian readership, which has a huge appetite for intellectual engagement and dialogue with the West. His second goal is to update and inform his Western interlocutors about the struggle for democracy inside Iran.

Akbar Ganji: Your book Varieties of Religion Today combines discussions of philosophy of religion and sociology of religion. Do you agree with this? Do you agree that this book combines these two different forms of discourse? If it is so, which one of these two discourses is dominant? Is it philosophy of religion or sociology of religion?

Charles Taylor: I think it’s neither and I think we have to add a third discourse, which is history. And I think that in the end there’s a single discourse, which is the only adequate one. Just as sociology without history can’t really get to the really important issues, so at the same time, if you don’t have a deep consideration of the philosophical issues, you can’t do good historical sociology. I mean, for instance, if you want to talk about religion, the development of religion, and let me say in parenthesis that I’m just claiming in that book (Varieties of Religion Today) and in my big book (A Secular Age) to be talking about religion in the West as it’s developed in the last 500 years. And so if you look at that, then you have to, if you are trying to develop a theory of the development of secularization, which means many things. But the two things it does mean is a change in the position of religion in society and also it means, to some degree, sometimes, a retreat of religion of belief and practice.

Now people sometimes confuse these two and it makes for confusion about what we mean by it. Now both these kinds of secularization have happened in the West. The first, the change of the position of religion has been general in the West. But the second, the retreat of religion has happened very, very differently. I mean virtually not at all in the United States. But in Sweden or East Germany very significant retreat has occurred and everything in between. Now you can’t come to grips with this kind of movement without a certain understanding of human motivation, of what is the human motivation in religion.

What motivates human beings in their religious life? Now I think that this motivation is very different in different times and periods. And we might miss this point because a lot of very powerful religions today, Islam, Christianity etc., are very close to each other in many respects in their driving motivations. But if you look wider at Hinduism, Buddhism, earlier forms of religion, you realize that there is just an immense difference. So that’s why I say that you can’t write a general history of secularization. Even writing one about the whole West is maybe too ambitious. But the philosophical element is essential if you take the mainline secularization theory of let’s say a post-war sociology.

People like Peter Berger in his earlier writings or today, someone like Steve Bruce is still continuing, they have a very simple story that the more modernity progresses—you know, things like industrialization, the development of the modern state, social mobility and all these markers—the more they develop, the more religion declines. Now this assumes, they never discuss it, but this assumes that the motivation to religious life in human beings is very shallow and not very profound, so that religious life is tied to certain sociological forms that existed earlier. And when these sociological forms are destabilized by modernity, religion disappears as well. But I disagree with that. That’s the philosophical point that needs to be at the core of your historical and sociological study. If you have a different view, you’ll have a very different theory of the whole development [of secularization]. And I mean to talk about how I see this movement in the West, the mainline theory—I mean the theory I’m attacking—thinks there is a linear movement of secularization as modernity advances. As one progresses the other progresses. A simple functional relationship.

Now according to my underlying theory, you’d expect something different. You would expect that certain developments of modernity would in fact destabilize earlier forms of religious life. I mean for instance the idea of a monarchy embedded in the cosmos connected to God, the kind of picture of the French monarchy, that’s not going to survive certain changes in society that come with modernity. But if the human relation to religion and to God is not as shallow as the mainstream theory thinks, then what would happen in many cases is religion would be recomposed in new forms that meet the new situation. And that is in fact what I would argue has happened in the West. So this is a much more adequate theory to understand this historical and sociological reality, but what it required is a deep understanding of the place of religion in human life. So I would claim that there’s a single discourse and it’s made up of elements that look as though they are drawn from three disciplines, but in fact they cohere together as a single discourse. The three discourses would be philosophy, history and sociology. You can’t do sociology without history, history without sociology, and you can’t do either without a proper philosophical understanding of human motivation. So the whole thing hangs together from those three sources.

[...]

Akbar Ganji: You state that we should have a historical point of view, but when we look at history we realize that in all of these historical cases that all of the democratic states are secular in that religion and state are separated. Empirically speaking, when we look at democracies we see in all of these cases there is a separation of religion and state. This could have three meanings. Number one is that the state does not derive its legitimacy from religion. The second one is that the state does not implement religious law. The third one is that clergy do not have a particular right or not even a particular right to rule. All democratic states share these three attributes…Since you have stated that that first principle lingers on as the other two have waned, what examples could you give in which a modern democratic state derives its legitimacy from divine sources such as from God?

Charles Taylor: …[C]onsider John Locke. Locke believes that we should follow the natural law and the natural law dictates that the only legitimate authority is created by a social contract. But, where does natural law come from? He is very clear. God has created human beings in the state of nature where natural law holds. It is God’s will, according to Locke that we have a social contract. So you get the founders of the American Republic who wrote a “Declaration of Independence” in which they said that “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed, by their CREATOR, with certain unalienable Rights.” So there are two ways in which legitimate democratic rule can derive from God. One is that the actual formula of democratic rule is God-given. And the other is that certain people, certain clergy, have a mandate directly from God to order the society. And in a certain sense, Western history is a struggle between these two understandings of God-derived authority.

[...]

Akbar Ganji: You have said in this book that we live in a post-Durkheimian world. And it has several attributes. The first one is that religious affiliations have nothing to do with our national identity. The second one is that the varieties of religious convictions have fractured and multiplied. The third one is that the religious life of a person depends on his own religious experience. It doesn’t depend on the church or a clerical order. The fourth one is that religious convictions are not transmitted from one generation to the next generation, but each generation has its own religious convictions that may be different from the convictions of their fathers and mothers. My question is how are these four related to one another and what is specific about this post-Durkheimian world that William James could not have understood or did not understand?

Charles Taylor: Well he understood lots but I think it’s the third one that I don’t quite agree with the formulation. See, a lot of religious life now is driven or determined by people’s sense of their own spiritual affinities. But the spiritual affinity can be with a larger church, a larger church or a clergy. That’s my case. Or it can be with a very small organization of friends, or it can be with a meditation group. So in other words, people don’t say anymore—I mean people never said this but in a sense unconsciously—I’m a Pole so I’ve got to be a Catholic. They are spiritually moved by something. It can be the Dali Lama, it can Pope John Paul etc. They move into that. This kind of following your own religious instinct has been totally legitimated in Western society. I would say that the big change occurred in the 1960s or there about, in which what was previously an elite ethic of authenticity, everybody following their own sense, became a mass cultural phenomenon. You can’t exaggerate this development and it’s a big change, almost a cataclysmic cultural change. But you see, that’s again something in the West. It certainly influences a small stratum of highly educated and mobile people working in the globalized economy, even if they come from India or, you know, they’re to some extent influenced by that. But as a mass phenomenon, it’s a Western phenomenon.

[...]

Akbar Ganji: How do you account for Christian, Jewish and Muslim fundamentalism?

Charles Taylor: I suppose there are different causes but one thing is relatively the same—it crops up again and again. I was saying earlier in my general theory of secularization that modern developments destabilize early forms of religion and that religion has to be recomposed, reformed. Well now there is a certain way of carrying out this reform which is based on a sense of threat. Somebody is depriving us of our traditional religion so we have to rally. And one way of rallying is to say, well, we’ll reach back to the origins and we’ll reproduce this kind of salafist movement. And then there is a terrible pathos here because they never do reproduce it because you can’t. I mean, for instance, take Protestant fundamentalism in this country. The first movement to take on the name and which gave this name wide currency was a Protestant movement that went back very strongly to the Protestant idea that the Bible was the ultimate source of truth. But then they found the challenge was from various kinds of modern science to the Bible, the Bible’s account of creation etc. So the response was to claim that the Bible was all literally true. But this was something new in Christian history, because it required, having made very clearly the distinction between literal truth, literal scientific truth, and metaphorical truth. Now this distinction was only made totally sharp with the arrival of modern Western science.

[...]

Akbar Ganji: Well you have talked about Catholic modernity in your writings. What is Catholic modernity?

Charles Taylor: The thing is that’s really another use of the word modernity. It’s not that it’s a particular form of modernity. It is how Catholics should understand their roll and position within modernity. And there it was an attempt to, in a certain sense, to relativize modernity. With the fundamental notion that Christianity is something—and you could say this of Islam as well—Christianity is a religion which has lived in a host of different cultures and will live in more cultures and always has to find a way of recreating an authentic version of itself within these cultures. And the idea was that we Catholics look on our relation to Western modernity in that light. This is one culture among many which humans have had and will have, and we have to fight away from the tendency which we have to think of this, or the version that’s been created in modernity, as vastly superior to everything else in history. Or also, greatly inferior because we’ve lost—you know, some people think we’ve lost the age of faith in the middle ages. That instead of looking at it as absolute, as one or the other, we look at it as having to function and recreate the faith in a different way in this civilization, but which is not necessarily superior to the way in which it operated in other parts. And we have to have had the sense of belonging to the transnational and transtemporal.

Akbar Ganji: Can you imagine Islamic modernity?

Charles Taylor: Of course. I mean I can imagine several because there are very different Islamic societies. I mean it would be one that was in real dialog and interchange with the modernity in which it set, via in India or in Europe. Unless we ruin the situation, which we’re capable of doing, we will see develop in the west a Western Islam, which is working its sense of what Islam is in this Western context. And I already know several people that are engaged in that, whether they define it that way or not, they’re engaged in that project. I mean we could wreck this enterprise. If the terrible conflict that I described earlier in which you have Muslims from outside the West that are dying to attack the West and Westerners that reply with this mindless anti-Islamic thing we have been seeing recently, we could crush the space in which this kind of European or Western Islam could grow. But it’s to be hoped that an Islamic modernity will happen, because that’s the normal development.

URL: http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/12/23/akbar-ganji-in-conversation-with-charles-taylor/

Saturday, April 11, 2009

Iran’s ‘Outlawed’ Nuclear Program by Jeremy R. Hammond (Foreign Policy Journal)

- Foreign Policy Journal - http://foreignpolicyjournal.com -

Iran’s ‘Outlawed’ Nuclear Program

Posted By Jeremy R. Hammond On April 8, 2009 @ 4:30 am In Analysis, Featured, Iran, Jeremy R. Hammond

A common refrain [1] in the Western media is that Iran’s nuclear program is illegal, “outlawed”, or otherwise of a proscribed nature. This assertion is based on the fact that the U.N. Security Council passed a number of resolutions calling on Iran to halt its enrichment activities and imposing sanctions on the country for disinclining to acquiesce to the U.N. demand. The U.S. view, adopted elsewhere as well, is that the resolutions are binding and by failing to heed their demands Iran is in violation of international law.

Iran’s view, of course, is that as a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), who has not been shown to have been developing a parallel weapons program, their program is perfectly legal and their right to enrich uranium guaranteed under international law. It is therefore the U.N. resolutions themselves which are illegal, a violation of the very Charter under which they were passed and therefore null and void.

There can only be one correct interpretation. In this case, a reading of the relevant texts under international law clearly demonstrates that Iran’s interpretation is actually the correct one.

The NPT obligates signatories to “undertake to accept safeguards” under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These safeguards are “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty”. Iran’s obligations are to employ its nuclear technology only for the production of energy. Any effort to develop nuclear weapons is strictly forbidden.

The safeguards, the NPT states, “shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties”. Sanctions, needless to say, hamper Iran’s economic and technological development.

Article IV states that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” (emphasis added). In other words, no one can tell Iran that it can’t enrich uranium for a civilian nuclear program.

The key U.N. resolution in question is 1696 of July 2006, which notes “with serious concern” that “Iran has not taken the steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, reiterated by the Council in its statements of 29 March and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran’s decision to resume enrichment-related activities….”

Notice the word “resume” there. Iran had voluntarily suspended its research and development of enrichment technology on a temporary basis as a show of good faith. Iran engaged E.U. member states, but when nothing came of the talks and negotiations over Iran’s program stalled, Iran resumed its activities, which it had every right to do under the NPT.

Furthermore, the NPT does not obligate Iran to halt research and development in order to “build confidence”. Iran must allow the IAEA to monitor and inspect its nuclear program under the safeguards system, but under no circumstances is required to suspend activities that are not shown to be undertaken towards the development of a nuclear weapon.

The language of 1696 is couched very carefully. The resolution “Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14″ and “Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities….”

Notice that the U.N. is appealing to the authority of the IAEA. However, short of evidence that Iran has actively engaged in research and development of a nuclear weapons program, neither the IAEA nor the U.N. has any legal basis to demand that Iran halt its activities. The NPT unambiguously guarantees the “inalienable right” of member states to develop a peaceful nuclear program, which includes enrichment of uranium for nuclear fuel. Moreover, nothing about Iran’s agreement to allow the IAEA to monitor and verify its program may be interpreted in a manner that prejudices that right. The NPT explicitly guarantees that parties may continue such activities while inspections are ongoing.

The IAEA Board of Governors resolution in question does not find Iran in violation of any of its obligations under the NPT. In fact, GOV/2006/14 categorically recognizes that “Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination….”

The IAEA resolution does not find Iran in violation of its obligations under the NPT, but merely “Expresses serious concern” that the Agency could not yet “clarify some important issues” and “Deeply regrets” that Iran had disinclined to acquiesce to requests to once again voluntarily suspend enrichment. Of course, there is no legal obligation for Iran to do so, and the IAEA resolution does nothing to suggest otherwise. It “Requests” that Iran “extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency”. The IAEA may request that Iran halt legitimate enrichment activities, but has no legal authority to demand that it do so.

So the authority of U.N. resolution 1696 demanding that Iran halt enrichment activities is based upon the authority of an IAEA resolution requesting that Iran do so while also expressly recognizing Iran’s “inalienable right” to continue said activities. This is the “context” of the relevant clause in 1696 forming the basis for the argument that Iran’s enrichment activities are illegal. Since in passing 1696 the U.N. took an IAEA request that Iran voluntarily halt said activities and falsely gave it the appearance of a legal obligation, this operative clause is therefore moot.

The lack of legal authority of the U.N. to demand that Iran halt its enrichment activities becomes even more apparent in recognizing the fact that 1696 was passed acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Article 40 states that the Security Council may “call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable”. But there are two caveats to this clause to consider.

First, the context, given in Article 39, is in cases where the Security Council has determined “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. If such a threat is determined to exist, the Security Council may make recommendations or decide upon further measures to be taken, but before doing so may “call upon” parties to take said provisional measures under Article 40. The U.N. Security Council, lacking evidence of proscribed activities, has not determined that Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a “threat to the peace” or a “breach of the peace”, or that Iran has engaged in any “act of aggression”.

Second, and perhaps even more importantly, Article 40 also clearly states that such provisional measures parties determined to pose a threat to peace are expected to abide by “shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned.” That would include Iran’s “inalienable right” under the NPT to continue enrichment activities for its civilian nuclear program operating under the IAEA safeguards system.

There’s a final point to consider. Assume, for argument’s sake, that Iran was found to be developing a nuclear weapons program and that the U.N. Security Council had passed a legitimate and legally binding resolution demanding that Iran cease this activity. The fact would remain that U.S. policy towards Iran, while in the hypothetical justified, would still reveal its glaring hypocrisy, considering its silence on the matter of the only state in the Middle East known to actually have a nuclear weapons program. Iran has in fact appealed to the U.S. to cooperate in making the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. But that would mean a shift in U.S. policy towards Israel and a cessation of its financial, military, and diplomatic support to the nuclear-armed Jewish State. So the proposal was summarily rejected.

One corollary might be that U.S. policy towards Iran is drastic need of reassessment. One might have hoped that such a policy review would occur under the Obama administration, but the new administration has already made it clear that it would continue the same policy as the Bush administration in demanding that Iran end its enrichment activities before entering negotiations on the matter; translated into meaningful terms, that means the U.S., contrary to Obama’s campaign rhetoric, will not engage in diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue, but instead continue to issue ultimatums.

The complicity of the mainstream corporate media in the West in constructing the framework wherein U.S. policy actually sounds somewhat reasonable is in large part the reason why such a hypocritical and erroneous policy is allowed to continue.


Article printed from Foreign Policy Journal: http://foreignpolicyjournal.com

URL to article: http://foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/08/irans-outlawed-nuclear-program/

URLs in this post:

[1] common refrain: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/87571cc6-206b-11de-b930-00144feabdc0.html

[2] Image: http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php


Copyright © 2009 Foreign Policy Journal. All rights reserved.

 

Dennis Ross's Iran Plan by Robert Dreyfuss (The Nation)

Dennis Ross's Iran Plan

Comment

By Robert Dreyfuss

This article appeared in the April 27, 2009 edition of The Nation.

April 8, 2009

When Dennis Ross, a hawkish, pro-Israel adviser to Barack Obama's presidential campaign, was elevated in February to the post of special adviser on "the Gulf and Southwest Asia"--i.e., Iran--Ross's critics hoped that his influence would be marginal. After all, unlike special envoys George Mitchell (Israel-Palestine) and Richard Holbrooke (Afghanistan-Pakistan), whose appointments were announced with fanfare, Ross's appointment was long delayed and then announced quietly, at night, in a press release.

But diplomats and Middle East watchers hoping Ross would be sidelined are wrong. He is building an empire at the State Department: hiring staff and, with his legendary flair for bureaucratic wrangling, cementing liaisons with a wide range of US officials. The Iran portfolio is his, says an insider. "Everything we've seen indicates that Ross has completely taken over the issue," says a key Iran specialist. "He's acting as if he's the guy. Wherever you go at State, they tell you, 'You've gotta go through Dennis.'"

It's paradoxical that Obama, who made opening a dialogue with Iran into a crucial plank in his campaign, would hand the Iran file to Ross. Since taking office, Obama has taken a number of important steps to open lines to Iran, including a remarkable holiday greeting by video in which the president spoke directly to "the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran," adding, "We seek engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect." He invited Iran to attend an international conference on Afghanistan, where a top Iranian diplomat shook hands with Holbrooke; he's allowing American diplomats to engage their Iranian counterparts; and he's reportedly planning to dispatch a letter directly to Iran's leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet Ross, like his neoconservative co-thinkers, is explicitly skeptical about the usefulness of diplomacy with Iran.

Widely viewed as a cog in the machine of Israel's Washington lobby, Ross was not likely to be welcomed in Tehran--and he wasn't. Iran's state radio described his appointment as "an apparent contradiction" with Obama's "announced policy to bring change in United States foreign policy." Kazem Jalali, a hardline member of the Iranian parliament's national security committee, joked that it "would have been so much better to pick Ariel Sharon or Ehud Olmert as special envoy to Iran." More seriously, a former White House official says that Ross has told colleagues that he believes the United States will ultimately have no choice but to attack Iran in response to its nuclear program.

Not quite a neoconservative himself, Ross has palled around with neocons for most of his career. In the 1970s and '80s he worked alongside Paul Wolfowitz at the Defense and State Departments, and with Andrew Marshall, a neoconservative strategist who leads the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessments. In 1985 Ross helped launch the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the Israel lobby's leading think tank.

From the late 1980s through 2000, Ross served as point man on Arab-Israeli issues for George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, acquiring a reputation as a highly skilled diplomat, albeit one with a pronounced pro-Israel tilt. He led the US side at the July 2000 Camp David summit, but he was deeply mistrusted by Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, and the feeling was mutual. At a crucial moment in the negotiations, Ross threw a tantrum, hurling a briefing book into a table full of juice and fruit. Not surprisingly, when Arafat rejected the Israelis' less-than-generous offer, Ross heaped blame on the Palestinians for scuttling the talks, the failure of which led directly to Ariel Sharon's rise to power and the second intifada. Daniel Kurtzer, an Orthodox Jew who served as US ambassador to Israel and Egypt and who was one of Obama's top Middle East advisers last year, co-wrote a book in which he explained, "The perception always was that Dennis started from the Israeli bottom line, that he listened to what Israel wanted and then tried to sell it to the Arabs."

From 2001 until his appointment in February, Ross was at WINEP, where he helped to oversee a series of reports designed to ring alarm bells about Iran's nuclear research and to support closer US-Israeli ties in response. Last summer, while advising Obama, he co-chaired a task force that produced a paper titled "Strengthening the Partnership: How to Deepen U.S.-Israel Cooperation on the Iranian Nuclear Challenge." That report opted for an alarmist view of Iran's nuclear program and proposed that the next president set up a formal US-Israeli mechanism for coordinating policy toward Iran (including any future need for "preventive military action"). Along with Holbrooke, Ross also helped found United Against Nuclear Iran, a group established to publicize warnings about Iran to the American public and the media. UANI's advisory board includes former CIA director James Woolsey and Fouad Ajami, perhaps the top Middle East expert for the neoconservative movement.

In September, Ross served as a key member of another task force organized by the Bipartisan Policy Center. The group assembled a flock of hawks under the leadership of Michael Makovsky, brother of WINEP's David Makovsky, who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the heyday of the Pentagon neocons from 2002 to 2006. Its report, "Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development"--written by Michael Rubin, a neoconservative hardliner at the American Enterprise Institute--read like a declaration of war.

The core of the Bipartisan Policy Center report predicted that diplomacy with Iran is likely to fail. Anticipating failure, Ross and his colleagues recommended "prepositioning military assets" by the United States--i.e., a military buildup--coupled with a US "show of force" in the Gulf. This would be followed almost immediately by a blockade of Iranian gasoline imports and oil exports, meant to paralyze Iran's economy, followed by what they call, not so euphemistically, "kinetic action."

That "kinetic action"--a US assault on Iran--should, in fact, be massive, suggested the Ross-Rubin task force. It should hit dozens of sites alleged to be part of Iran's nuclear research program, along with other targets, including Iranian air defense sites, Revolutionary Guard facilities, much of Iran's military-industrial complex, communications systems, munitions storage facilities, airfields and naval facilities. Eventually, the report concluded, the United States would also have to attack Iran's ground forces, electric power plants and electrical grids, bridges and "manufacturing plants, including steel, autos, buses, etc."

Like virtually all of his neoconservative confreres, Ross does not argue that negotiations with Iran should not proceed. Surrendering to the inevitability of a US-Iran dialogue, they insist instead that any such talks proceed according to a strict time limit, measured in weeks or, at most, a few months. In November, Iran specialist Patrick Clawson, Ross's colleague at WINEP, described any US-Iran dialogue that might emerge as mere theater. "What we've got to do is...show the world that we're doing a heck of a lot to try and engage the Iranians," he said. "Our principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran. Our principal target with these offers is, in fact, American public opinion [and] world public opinion." Once that's done, he implied, the United States would have to take out its big stick.

The reality, however, is that negotiations between Iran and the United States might take many, many months, perhaps years. Putting US-Iran diplomacy on a short fuse, as Ross and his colleagues want to do, guarantees its failure, setting the stage for harsher sanctions, embargoes and the "kinetic action" that Ross has suggested might follow.

About Robert Dreyfuss

Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist in Alexandria, Virginia, specializing in politics and national security. He is the author of Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam and is a frequent contributor to Rolling Stone, The American Prospect, and Mother Jones.

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090427/dreyfuss?rel=hp_currently

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